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The key to long-term success in the Global War on Terrorism involves 
maximizing the effectiveness of U.S. military aid to partner nations.  The United 
States can not sustain long-duration deployments of thousands of troops.  
However, international crisis will not likely subside.  The United States needs to 
encourage and better prepare its partner nations to take more active roles.  As 
exemplified in Colombia, Security Assistance Organizations must build and 
increase the capabilities of our partner nations’ militaries and be prepared to 
rapidly expand to support a partner nation’s counter-insurgent/terrorist/narco-
terrorist effort.  Current world-wide SAO structures do not adequately support 
such robust ventures.   
The Government of Colombia has been fighting insurgents, international 
crime, and terrorism for the past five decades.  Plan Colombia and post-911 
expanded authorities have allowed the United States to provide substantial and 
increasing support to assist Colombia.  U.S. support to the Republic of Colombia, 
may be considered a model for limited Joint support to a partner nation’s CT/CNT 
fight.  The current MILGP-Colombia re-structuring plan provides a base model 
from which a flexible model for a more robust and responsive SAO. . . a Joint 
Security Assistance & Cooperation Command (JSACC).  JSACCs will allow the 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Any issue of the Army Times published during the past five years, gives 
the impression that the Global  War on Terrorism, or what is now referred to as 
“The Long War,” should more aptly be named the “The War against Islamic 
Fundamentalists.”  Traditionally, page seven consists of a world map with the 
current troop strengths deployed world-wide in support of counter-terrorist, 
peace-keeping, and disaster relief operations.  The Army Times emphasizes the 
US military’s main effort, the USCENTCOM AOR, with little or no recognition 
given to the supporting efforts of the other Combatant Commands (COCOMs); 
especially U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).  Although the four largest 
military support packages (Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt) go to countries 
residing in the USCENTCOM AOR, U.S. support to Colombia (which ranks 5th) 
has been our biggest success to date.  “The Colombian armed conflict is one of 
the oldest in the world; it is only superseded in time by the Israeli-Palestinian and 
India-Pakistan conflicts, and is the only ongoing armed conflict in North and 
South America.”1  However, this is not depicted on the Army Times’ map.  The 
fight against terrorism in Colombia long predates that of Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The Government of Colombia has been fighting insurgents, international crime, 
and terrorism continually for the past five decades.  During the last decade, the 
United States has provided substantial support, primarily through support for 
Plan Colombia (see Annex C), to allow the Colombian Government to finally 
make headway against a stubborn insurgency. 
 
B. CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIAN HISTORY 
Colombia’s history is one of endemic violence and conflict.  The current 
internal security issues have plagued Colombia for more than half a century.  
                                                 
1 Fabio Sanchez, Conflict, State and Decentralization; from Social Progress to Armed Dispute 
for Local Control, 1974-2002 (London: Crisis States Programme, 2005), 2. 
 2
They began with the election of a conservative president in 1946 and exploded 
on the 9th of April, 1948 with the assassination of a populist liberal politician with 
presidential aspirations, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.  His murder triggered the initial 
violence which killed 2,000 in Bogotá and eventually claimed 200,000 lives over 
the next 18 years in what became known as La Violencia.2  Aside from the 
catastrophic number of deaths, La Violencia was also responsible for spinning off 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia – FARC) as a by-product.  Subsequently, several other guerrilla 
groups arose in Colombia.  In 1964, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional  – ELN) mimicked the revolutionary Marxists model created 
by Fidel Castro in Cuba.  In 1974, the M-19, which mirrored the Tupamaros in 
Uruguay, formed after the former military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla charged 
electoral fraud in the presidential election of April 19, 1970.  In 1997, various 
illegitimate paramilitary groups came together to form the Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia (AUC).  These groups were originally created in the 1960’s to 
provide security to large landowners and cattle ranchers, while other paramilitary 
groups provided security for the narco-traffickers. 
Since 2002, when Alvaro Uribe became president, the Colombian Military 
(COLMIL) has taken the fight to the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC.  In 2005, 
FARC strength was estimated at 11,445 fighters (reduced from a previous high of 
approximately 18,000) and the organization had an annual income of over 
US$340 million.3  The current demobilization of the AUC has theoretically 
eliminated the once formidable paramilitary organization.4  However, various 
criminal organizations have grown from the pre-existing AUC networks and they 
now resemble a narcotrafficking organization in both organization and function.  
                                                 
2 Department of the Army, Colombia: a country study (Washington, 1990), xxv. 
3 Ejército de Colombia. “Counter-Insurgency in Colombia.” Powerpoint briefing presented to 
NPS class SO 4850, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, by LTC Erik Valentzas (May 
2006). 
4 Ejército de Colombia. “Counter-Insurgency in Colombia.” Powerpoint briefing presented to 
NPS class SO 4160, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, by LTC Erik Valentzas (May 
2006). 
 3
The ELN numbers around 3,100 and is in the process of negotiating a peace with 
the Government of Colombian.5  These three groups are on the U.S. Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list, the equivalent of America’s Most Wanted for 
terrorist organizations.  Their inclusion on this list allows Washington to fund a 
variety of programs in Colombia that target the activities of these groups.   
 
C. U.S. – COLOMBIAN RELATIONS 
Aside from a brief conflict at the turn of the past century over the 
independence of the Colombian province of Panama, Colombia and the United 
States have historically enjoyed cordial relations.  Bordering five other countries 
and connecting Central America with South America, the Republic of Colombia 
occupies a strategic position in the Western Hemisphere.  Together with its 
strategic geography, Colombia is also a fertile land replete with natural 
resources.  Unfortunately, in an atmosphere of political fragmentation and 
lawlessness, those resources have been invested too often in violence.  
Colombia has become notorious for its illicit exports: cocaine, marijuana, and 
heroin.  Estimates of Colombia’s contribution to the world’s cocaine supply 
ranges from 67% (United Nations) to 80% (U.S. State Department).6  What is not 
in contention, however, is that Colombia is also the largest producer of cocaine 
and heroin for the United States.  Colombia supplies 90% of the cocaine 
consumed annually in the United States.7  Unfortunately, it is the high level of 
illegally smuggled drugs into the United States, rather than the production and 
trade of coffee, flowers, or the petroleum for which Colombia would prefer to be 
known, that has brought the two governments closer together.   
 
 
                                                 
5 Ejército de Colombia. “Counter-Insurgency in Colombia.” Powerpoint briefing presented to 
NPS class SO 4850, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, by LTC Erik Valentzas (May 
2006).   
6 Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report (Washington: Congressional Research 
Service-Library of Congress, 11 January 2006), 4. 
7 William M. Arkin, Code Names (Hanover, 2005), 98. 
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D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has stretched the United States 
military to its limits.  The key to long term success involves maximizing the 
effectiveness of our military aid to partner nations.  It has become evident that 
the United States will not be able to sustain long-duration deployments of 
thousands of U.S. troops.  However, the work load will not likely subside.  
Therefore, the United States will need to encourage its partner nations to take a 
more active role.  However, many are under prepared to face the present day 
challenges.  Therefore, the U.S. military’s security cooperation with partner 
nations must be able to help build and increase the capabilities of our partners 
nations’ militaries.  U.S. support to the Republic of Colombia over the past 
decade may be considered such a model for limited U.S. support to a partner 
nation’s counter-insurgent, counter-terrorist, and/or counter-narco-terrorist effort.     
Security Assistance for Colombia, which grew from just a counter-drug 
(CD) focus to a broader counter-terrorism (CT), has been largely successful in 
enhancing the capabilities of the Colombian military and meeting U.S. policy 
goals of increasing democratic stability.  Although the overall effectiveness of 
U.S. efforts (especially aerial eradication) in recent years has been in question, a 
January 2006 evaluation of Plan Colombia stated: “measurable progress in 
Colombia’s internal security has been made, as indicated by decreases in 
violence and the eradication of drug crops. . . prices8 for both drugs have 
increased, whereas purity and availability have decreased.”9  However, a 19 
August 2006 New York Times article contradicts these conclusions: “price, 
quality, and availability of cocaine on the U.S. streets remained virtually 
unchanged.”10  Nevertheless, the United States has unquestionably empowered 
                                                 
8 Price, purity and availability are the common metrics used by both law enforcement and the 
U.S. government to measure progress on the War on Drugs. 
9 Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report (Washington: Congressional Research 
Service-Library of Congress, January 2006), 3. 
10 Juan Forero, “Colombia’s Coca Survives U.S. Plan to Uproot It” (New York, August 2006).   
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/19/america/web.0819coca.php. Last accessed 26 
November 2006.   
 5
the Colombian Government to improve their security situation.  Without a large 
scale deployment, the United States has been able to leverage consistently 
substantial funding levels11 combined with tailor made support packages to 
increase the capability of the Colombian Military.  The initial training of the 
Brigada Contra el Narcotrafico (BRCNA) - the Colombian Counter-Drug Brigade; 
the development of La Escuela Conjunta de Aviación - Colombian Armed Forces 
Aviation Center; and the Sistema Integrado Logístico (SILOG) – the Colombian 
Joint Logistics System serve as just a few examples of how U.S. military 
assistance has bolstered the Colombian security situation.  Many different 
metrics have been used to measure the increase in Colombian security: 
• The CNP now has a permanent presence in every municipality 
• Kidnappings dropped 34%12  
• Homicides dropped 15% 
• Extortion dropped 49% 
• Illegal Road Blocks dropped 62%13 
The current Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) for U.S. Embassy Bogotá, 
Milton Drucker, fears that U.S. policy in Colombia might fall victim to its own 
success; “The problem with U.S. strategic policy, Drucker believes,  is that we 
don’t fund success, we fund failures . . . the fact that we are succeeding here in 
Colombia gives me concern that we may experience reductions in our funding.”14  
U.S Army tactical doctrine encourages reinforcement of success on the 
battlefield and disengagement of unsuccessful endeavors.  Drucker’s contention 
is that U.S. strategic policy funds failing situations and is quick to withdraw funds 
                                                 
11 USG funding for Colombia are the largest in Latin America at approximately US$1 billion 
per year (including US$170 million from DoD and FMF funding).  However, that is relatively small 
level by USG-WOT standards, which funds several hundred billion to Iraq & Afghanistan 
annually).  
12 However, a 11 January 2006 CRS report for Congress claimed, “although the rate of 
kidnappings has decreased significantly, Colombia still has the highest kidnapping rate in the 
world.” 
13 Government of Colombia - Ministry of Defense, “Measures of Violence” (Washington, 
January 2006), 9. From a CRS report “Plan Colombia: A Progress Report.” 
14 Milton Drucker, Deputy Chief of Mission-U.S. Embassy-Bogotá. Interviewed by author, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (27 September 2006). 
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from ventures when they begin to show progress.  Drucker’s fear is that, 
Washington may withdraw funding from Colombia just when our efforts there 
begin to show progress. 
As Plan Colombia officially ended in December 2005, the Government of 
Colombia (GOC) at present is writing a continuation document in concert with 
U.S. Embassy-Bogotá in order to improve the chances of eliciting further support 
from the U.S. Congress.  Colombians are aware that U.S. resources are not 
infinite, especially in light of the current resource demands in the U.S. Central 
Command Area of Responsibility (USCENTCOM AOR).  As a result, the 
Colombian Military is weighing the possibilities and consequences of 
“nationalizing” certain U.S. support packages to mitigate the effects of an 
inevitable curtailment of the previous levels of U.S. support.  The U.S. Embassy 
in Bogotá is developing, in conjunction with the Colombian Ministry of Defense, 
contingencies to mitigate potential funding changes.  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
Department of Defense through the U.S. Military Group (USMILGP) in Colombia 
continues to provide a wide array of support to the Colombian Armed Forces. 
 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In light of the official end of Plan Colombia, this research project will 
attempt to predict the future level and extent of U.S. support to Colombia based 
on information gathered from U.S. and Colombian officials. 
 
F. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to explain and analyze the current 
USMILGP-Colombia reorganization proposal.  It will make recommendations, as 
applicable; to create a model for a new type of expanded Security Assistance 
Organization (that will be referred to as Joint Security Assistance & Cooperation 
Command).  The goal is to provide a blueprint for a broader Security Cooperation 
organization with the capability of taking on a potential FID and combat support 
missions to effectively assist a partner nation. 
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G. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
In 2005, USMILGP-Colombia began the process of reorganization.  By 
May of 2006, the first “MILGP-COL Reorganization Paper” was complete, 
delineating all of the challenges with the existing structure.  After staffing the 
paper and receiving guidance from the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, 
MILGP-Colombia sent an updated version of the proposal in a memorandum to 
the SOUTHCOM J3, BG Salvatore Cambria, entitled, “MILGP Reorganization.”  
This was not approved by General Bantz Craddock before changing command in 
October of 2006 due to non-concurrence by the SOUTHCOM J2 and the Joint 
Interagency Task Force – South (a subordinate of SOUTHCOM).  The results of 
this thesis will be distributed to U.S. Southern Command and U.S. MILGP – 
Colombia. 
 
H. METHOD & SOURCES 
(1)  Review of current doctrine for Security Assistance, Security 
Cooperation and Foreign Internal Defense to identify potential functions and 
missions of a Joint Security Assistance & Cooperation Command (JSACC).   
 (2)  Case studies will examine the advisory organizations utilized in both 
Vietnam and El Salvador and their implications on Colombia today, as well as 
their implications for future organizations. 
 (3)  Personal experience in Colombia combined with input and assistance 
from past and present MILGP Commanders, MILGP Executive Officers, Mission 
Chiefs, and various other DoD and DoS personnel stationed in Colombia serve 
































II.   THE DOCTRINE OF PARTNER NATION SUPPORT 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The United States Congress has detailed exactly how the Department of 
Defense can support a partner nation in building and improving its security 
capabilities.  The Department of State decides annually the level of funding 
partner nations will receive and allows the Department of Defense to execute the 
security assistance programs paid for by those DoS dollars.  But it is the 
Department of Defense that has created both the Joint doctrine and the 
appropriate service level doctrine to determine how to best support our partner 
nation’s security needs.  Those doctrinal concepts fall under many different titles, 
the most prevalent ones will be discussed in this chapter: Foreign Internal 
Defense, Security Assistance, Security Cooperation, and Security Assistance 
Organizations.   
 
B. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 
The United States Military defines Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
as: The participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization, to free and protect its 
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.15 
Hence, FID is more than just a menu of U.S. military programs aimed at building 
the defense capabilities of a partner nation (PN)/host nation (HN).16   Frequently, 
U.S. sponsored security programs overshadow other ongoing social, economic, 
and informational programs that, to function properly, require a secure 
environment established by a credible, professional military in support of a 
legitimate government.  American forces have supported partner nations by 
                                                 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Foreign Internal Defense) (Washington, April 2004), ix.  
16 The terms “host nation” and “partner nation” have become synonymous over time.  The 
former term was used in conjunction with Security Assistance during the Cold War.  The later is a 
newer term that is used in conjunction with Security Cooperation.  
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building capabilities since the aftermath of the Spanish-American War.  However, 
the concept of security building greatly expanded as part of the Truman Doctrine, 
which pledged a wide array of support to countries that were opposing Soviet-
sponsored/supported insurgencies during the Cold War. 
FID as we know it today grew out of the Nixon Doctrine of the 1960’s, with 
the premise that Washington should support countries whose national security 
objectives align with those of the United States and who are willing to provide the 
manpower to resolve their own internal problems.  The United States Department 
of Defense (DoD) is institutionally prepared to utilize three tools at its disposal to 
contribute to the U.S. Government’s (USG) overall FID mission: 
 
1. Indirect Support:  Security Assistance, Exercises, Training, Personnel 
Exchanges: aimed at building the partner nation’s self-sufficiency. 
 
2. Direct Support (not involving combat operations):  U.S. forces 
providing direct assistance with communications, intelligence, logistics, 
psychological operations, civil-military operations: immediately fulfilling 
partner nation’s shortcomings. 
 
3. Combat Operations:  Strategically defensive in nature: immediately 
establishing security for the PN in order to stabilize the environment for 
other activities. 
 
The majority of DoD’s FID activities fall into the Indirect Support category, 
with Security Assistance (SA) as one of the primary tools.  Security Assistance is 
the equipping, maintaining, and training of a partner nation so that they possess 
an ability to maintain a defense against internal and/or external threats.  A key 
aspect of Security Assistance is the financial options available to the partner 
nation based on international agreements.  Equipment, training, and 
maintenance can be sold, loaned, granted, or offset depending on the agreement 
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that the United States has with the partner nation.  In order to receive security 
assistance, partner nations must provide the manpower to support the 
equipment/training, devote an adequate amount of their own resources to the 
program, and have a plan to eventually take over the program on their own to 
include long-term maintenance.  Security Assistance, a concept developed in the 
Cold-War, is designed to foster long-term security relationships.  It may take 
upwards of 2-3 years for equipment to actually get fielded to a foreign country 
depending on availability and priority.17  The contemporary criticism of Security 
Assistance is that is not responsive enough to meet the evolving needs of our 
partner nations. 
Vietnam left the nation averse to committing U.S. troops directly to combat 
for what was seen as primarily an internal fight, on the premise that direct U.S. 
intervention in combat bred dependency and over reliance on U.S. support.  
Whether U.S. troops are used in a combat role or not, FID is not an easy mission 
to accomplish and might take years to have a lasting impact.  With a great deal of 
experience in planning, resourcing, and conducting FID missions in Latin 
America, LTC Mike Brown, U.S. Army Section Chief in Colombia, notes that, 
“going into a country, building a capability, and then stepping back leaving a self 
sufficient host nation force is not that easy to do.  There are probably one or two 
cases where it has worked and probably more than 50 cases where it has 
failed.”18   
 
C. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
The concept of Security Assistance originated in the post-World War II 
Truman Administration.  President Truman’s inaugural address in January 1949 
laid the foundation for the subsequent development of several programs which 
                                                 
17 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Assistance,  (Ohio, January 2005), 5-1. 
18 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (30 April 2006). 
 12
are still in existence today.19  However, actual security assistance organizations 
as seen today originated in 1961 as part of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).  
After, the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the U.S. Congress wanted to establish 
parameters on SAO activities, limiting them to tasks required to facilitate the 
security assistance mission.  Eventually a Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
study led to the development of Policy Letter 97-113, amending Section 515 of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  The policy delineates the tasks authorized 
by the President of the United States to be undertaken by military members 
assigned to a foreign country:20 
1. Evaluation of HN military capabilities and requirements 
2. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Case Management (EDA, FMF) 
3. Training Management (IMET) 
4. Program Monitoring (EUM) 
5. Rationalization, Standardization, Interoperability (RSI) 
6. International Armaments Cooperative Program (IACP) 
7. Liaison functions (excluding advising and training) 
8. Administrative support 
The Defense Institute of Security Management Assistance (DISAM) educates 
and trains the officers that execute the SA mission world-wide.  DISAM is part of 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) which has oversight for larger 
Security Cooperation mission.   
 
D. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
Security Assistance funding levels for various U.S. allies is set by the U.S. 
Department of State.  However, the actual execution of Security Assistance (SA) 
programs, purchases, and training is orchestrated by the Department of Defense.  
To coordinate and facilitate the accomplishment of the Security Assistance 
                                                 
19 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security 
Assistance,  (Ohio, January 2005), 5-1. 
20 Allan Stolberg. “Security Cooperation as a Tool of American Foreign Policy.”  Lecture to 
Foreign Area Officers, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA, (March 2006).   
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mission and the larger Security Cooperation, DoD established the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on 31 October 2000 to “foster Security 
Cooperation programs vital to U.S. national security to build trust and influence in 
peacetime, to have access to regions of the world during times of crisis, and to 
ensure interoperability with coalition partners during times of conflict.”21  DSCA 
and its associated legislation allowed for the creation of the special military 
sections that work in foreign countries to execute the mission of security 
assistance.  These organizations, called Security Assistance Organizations 
(SAOs), are unique within the Department of Defense and are separate from the 
Defense Attaches’ Office (DAO) which are also found in the U.S. Embassy but 
have a distinctly different mission.  Defense Attaches are charged with providing 
military information and maintaining communications channels in order to 
facilitate service to service and DoD representational matters.  Depending on the 
country, either the SAO or the DAO chief is designated as the United States 
Defense Representative (USDR).22  SAOs tend to be the USDR in the U.S. 
Southern Command AOR, while DAOs tend to be the USDR in the U.S. 
European Command (USEUCOM) AOR.  The U.S. Pacific (USPACOM) and the 
U.S. Central Command tend to share the responsibility evenly between the two.23  
SAOs vary in size and structure and adopt a wide array of titles to express and 
define the relationship that exist between our partner nations and the United 
States.  So, while there are 16 different titles for SAOs throughout the world, all 
essentially execute the same missions.  Europe and African countries tend to 
have Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC), while many Latin American 
                                                 
21 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “Strength Through Cooperation,” (Ohio, July 2006). 
www.dsca.mil Last accessed 13 July 2006. 
22 In 2002 a study of the feasibility of consolidating SAOs & DAOs in order to streamline 
communications and improve overall effectiveness was conducted.  However, the heads of 
neither organization, DIA (DAOs) and the COCOMs (SAOs) were willing to have their 
organization work for the other for fear that a change in the command relationship would cause a 
loss of control.  Regardless, both DIA and DSCA as they are currently structured are considered 
to be relics of the Cold War worthy of modernization. 
23 LtCol Kurt Marisa, “Consolidated Military Attache and Security Assistance Activities: A 
Case for Unity of Command” (Washington, December 2003), 8. 
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countries have U.S. Military Groups.24  SAOs can vary in size from just a couple 
of military personnel augmented by a few local host nation hires, to several 
hundred U.S. military personnel supported by hundreds of host nation personnel 
and contractors.  If a SAO has more than six uniformed service members, 
Congressional approval for the mission is required.25  SAOs can be established 
with subordinate sections organized along service lines (Army, Navy/USMC, Air 
Force) or along functional lines (Administration, Training, Plans, Logistics) similar 




            
Figure 1. Typical Functionally Aligned SAO 
 
 
                                                 
24 Marisa, Consolidated, 9. 
25 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Foreign Internal Defense) (Washington, April 2004), II-13. 













            
Figure 2. Typical Service Aligned SAO 
 
Although the levels of support provided by a SAO are determined by funding, all 
SAOs are essentially capable of providing the same array of capabilities and 
service to the partner nation.  The key is that the SAOs play an indirect and 
supporting role and are not designed to conduct operations or direct actions 
missions like that of a Joint Task Force (JTF).   
As their name indicates, SAO’s primary mission is to provide a means of 
interface with the partner nation on matters of security assistance.  By law, the 
SAO is prohibited from actually training PN forces in tasks normally taught by 
other organizations27, like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security  
                                                 
27 The exception is training which is paid for through CD, CT, or another funding source other 



























Cooperation (WHINSEC) or any U.S. Army service school.28  Since security 
assistance funding is allocated by the Department of State and is administered 
by the Department of Defense, SAOs report and coordinate through the U.S. 
Ambassador, much in the same manner as any other non DoS Country Team 
member.  On all other matters, the SAOs work for their respective combatant 
command and are often authorized to coordinate directly with the service 
components on specific service related matters.  The degree to which the SAO is 
controlled by their RCC varies by Geographical Combatant Command.  
According to the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, “the SAO 
by law is under the direction and supervision of the U.S. Ambassador (also 
known as the Chief of Mission [COM]).  Additionally, the SAO, by DoD policy, is 
under the command and supervision of the geographical combatant commander 
in matters that are not functions or responsibilities of the Ambassador.”29  The 
fact that SAOs answer to two bosses simultaneously, one military and one 
civilian, make the organizations subject to potential conflict and confusion.  
Therefore, SAOs must juggle multiple responsibilities while simultaneously 
working for two different chiefs and coordinating with several different State-side 
organizations, all while working within the parameters of the partner nation’s 
culture.  According to LTC Mike Brown, who has worked for US Embassy-Bogota 
for close to five years,  
as the professional relationship between the RCCs and 
Ambassadors continue to mature, the SAO is now more easily able to 
raise disagreements to the COM and RCC.  The SAO focuses on 
proposing potential solutions.  This happens generally over policy issues 
which at a minimum are the forum of the CoM and RCC and often more 
senior officers.30 
 
                                                 
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Foreign Internal Defense) (Washington, April 2004), II-13. 
29 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of 
SecurityAssistance, (Ohio, 2005), 34. 
30 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (19 Deceomber 2006).  
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The SAO, in coordination with the Embassy’s Country Team, helps define and 
execute the Country Team Plan while simultaneously executing the National 
Military Strategy through the Regional Combatant Command’s (RCC’s) Theater 
Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).  
 
E. SECURITY COOPERATION 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took theater/security engagement 
a step further in the post-September 11, 2001 world by expanding the newer 
concept of “Security Cooperation.”  Engagement with foreign countries is done 
for political reasons, whereas cooperation builds capabilities to serve a U.S. 
interest.  The Defense Department’s Security Cooperation Guidance defines 
Security Cooperation (SC) as: 
 Those activities that are conducted with allied and friendly 
foreign defense establishments to build closer bilateral relationships 
that promote long-term American diplomatic, military, or economic 
interests in a given region.  It is also directed towards specific 
states, with the intent of building allied and friendly capabilities for 
self-defense and coalition operations, and providing U.S. forces 
with peacetime and contingency access and enroute infrastructure 
that can be used in support of ongoing military operations.31 
In short, Security Cooperation: 
• Builds security relationships to promote U.S. interests 
• Builds PN capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations 
• Provide contingency and peacetime access for U.S. forces  
 
Whereas Security Assistance aims more narrowly to improve a partner nation’s 
military capabilities, Security Cooperation treats partner nations as equals and 
attempts to gain common understandings and appreciations for international 
problems with the desire to develop joint solutions.32  Security Cooperation still 
                                                 
31 U.S. Department of Defense, “Security Cooperation Guidance” (Washington, 2005). 
32 The switch from engagement to security cooperation can be seen as a corollary to 
President Bush’s post 911 foreign policy of “you are either with us or against us,” expressed in his 
speech of 6 November 2001.  
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seeks to develop a partner nation’s military, but it also attempts to maximize 
advantages for the United States.33  The gains from Security Assistance seldom 
equal the monetary value of the U.S. outlays, but the return on the investment 
should fall within the constraints and existing resources of the partner nation.  
Historically, this fact has led to the debate as to whether or not the United States 
receives a good return on its security assistance investment.  Now that Security 
Assistance has become part of Security Cooperation and is one tool of many 
which can be implemented, there is less emphasis on the debate.  
The advantages gained by the United States in return for the Security 
Assistance provided may include basing rights, permission to execute naval 
exercises or operations in the partner nation’s territorial waters, or simply 
overflight rights.  The deployments to Iraq in 2003-2004 of battalions from El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic offer examples of a 
return on America’s Security Cooperation investment in Latin America.  El 
Salvador was the first country to make a commitment and to have troops on the 
ground.34  As of October 2006, El Salvador was on their fifth 300-man rotation; 
which in total equates to over 10% of their overall force.  All Latin American 
battalions did not provide the same level of capability for various reasons.  
Interestingly, the strongest contributor, El Salvador, demonstrated not only the 
capability, but also the resolve to work within the U.S. led Coalition.  The 
Salvadoran success, in part, can be traced to the general level of Security 
Assistance provided to Salvador to combat a left-wing insurgency during the 
1980’s.  However, aside from joining the coalition to support their long-time ally in 
gratitude for help rendered in previous decades, El Salvador has other motives 
as well.  Apart from the experience, additional U.S. training, and increased 
security assistance, El Salvador gains tremendous political and economical 
dividends with the United States vis a vis continued Congressional support for 
                                                 
33 National Archives, Speech by President Bush (Washington, 2001). 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v37no45 Last accessed 26 November 2006.             
34 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (23 September 2006).  
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them receiving Temporary Protected Status (TPS).  TPS gives Salvadorian 
aliens the ability to remain in the United States and gain employment, which in 
turn allows for the continuation of the historically large remittances that El 
Salvador’s economy has become dependent on.  Security Cooperation remains 
at its core a team concept, anchored in reciprocal agreements and commitments.  
A fundamental premise of Security Cooperation is that we have as much to gain 
from our partners as they do from us.   
 Security Cooperation is where the rubber meets the road, the interface 
between U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. National Military Strategy.  It serves 
several purposes: to maintain open relations; to facilitate the rapid deployment of 
U.S. forces to/through the partner nation in time of international emergency; to 
enhance partner nation capabilities; to maintain senior leader relations to 
facilitate problem resolution and coordinate combined military efforts during 
peace and war; to demonstrate how the U.S. military functions as a subordinate 
to a democratically elected executive; and to support national foreign policy.35  
The improvement of partner nation capabilities can serve two purposes: first it 
allows the partner nation to support U.S. security interests.  Second, it lessens 
the need for a deployment of U.S. forces for something that could be 
accomplished by a well trained partner nation.  The combined impacts of Security 
Cooperation make it the most powerful element of military power short of an 
actual use of force.  U.S. Security Cooperation goals aim to ensure that our 
partner nations maintain their highest possible level of readiness and possess a 
competency which would allow them to confront common security challenges, 
thus minimizing the need for a U.S. troop deployment.  Security Cooperation is a 
much more comprehensive and broader approach to working with partner 
nations than is Security Assistance.  Security Assistance becomes one key 
component of the cooperation plan, which entails synchronizing a series of 
                                                 
35 Allan Stolberg. “Security Cooperation as a Tool of American Foreign Policy.”  Lecture to 
Foreign Area Officers, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, CA, (March 2006). 
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programs tailored to a specific partner nation’s needs.  Other elements of 
Security Cooperation include but are not limited to: 
    
• Combined36 Counter-Trafficking Operations: Counter-Drug (CD) 
Operations, US Support to Aerial Eradication, Air Bridge Denial 
• Combined Exercises: Sponsored by the JCS, COCOM, or a Service 
Component, conducted either in the U.S. or OCONUS 
• Combined Education: Educating foreign military personnel at U.S. 
schools both in the U.S. and OCONUS 
• Combined Training: (other than exercises) U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Mobile 
Training Teams (MTTs) 
• Combined Experimentation: Bilateral or multilateral efforts to 
improve interoperability (i.e. communications, C2, intelligence, etc.) 
• Defense/Military Contacts: Distinguished Visitor Programs (DVPs), 
ship visits, bi-lateral/multi-lateral talks, regional conferences, Personnel 
Exchange Programs (PEPs), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges 
(SMEEs) 
• Humanitarian-Civic Assistance (HCA): Humanitarian relief, 
demining, medical readiness & training exercise (MEDRETE), disaster 
relief training  
• Peace Keeping Operations (PKO): Exercises, seminars, agreements, 
and equipping through DoS Global PKO Initiative 
  
USMILGP-Colombia has the lead from SOUTHCOM for implementing and 
synchronizing the various Security Cooperation programs and activities so that 
each one serves a specific purpose which contributes to the overall program’s 
objectives.  According to the former Commander of the Colombian Armed 
                                                 
36 The doctrinal definition of “Combined” includes the participation of one or more partner 
nations (sometimes referred to as “multi-national”), whereas “Joint” refers to operations including 
two or more services of the same nation. 
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Forces, General Carlos Ospina Ovalle, “U.S. support to Colombia comes in 
various forms.  The greatest contribution from the support comes from the 
integrated strategy that the Americans help implement.”37   
Security Assistance is a very important legal component of Security 
Cooperation.  The legislation governing SA and the funding from DoS through 
DSCA (which comes from Foreign Military Finance/Foreign Military Sales 
[FMF/FMS]/International Military Education & Training [IMET] fees charged to 
participating countries) allows for the creations of SAOs.  These SAOs, by 
default, handle much more than just Security Assistance, they have become 
defacto Security Cooperation Offices.38  Without forward deployed SAO’s, the 
Regional Component Commanders would find it difficult to develop and execute 
their TSCPs.  However, since SAOs are authorized and staffed depending on the 
level of Security Assistance they provide, RCCs often augment the SAOs with 
additional personnel in order to assist with the other tasks that are associated 
with the security cooperation mission.39  The number of augmentees may reach 
into the hundreds, as in the case of MILGP Colombia.  Because of all of the 
aforementioned factors and since the typical Security Assistance Organization 
does much more than execute Security Assistance transactions, SAO’s should 
more aptly be renamed.  Due to the Joint nature of the organizations and 
important role of Security Cooperation, the name “Joint Security Assistance & 
Cooperation Command (JSACC) would be more appropriate to replace the 
traditional SAO titles (MILGP, MAAG, MLO, ODC, etc.).  
  
                                                 
37 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (23 September 2006). 
38 Marisa, Consolidated, 9. 
39 In 2004, when USMILGP-Venezuela became virtually ineffective due to the political 
situation between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments, SOUTHCOM moved several billets 
(both civilian and military) temporarily from Caracas to Bogotá.  This helped provide additional 
manning to USMILGP-Colombia, while retaining the flexibility to eventually move the billets back 
































III.   HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 United States Military Group – Colombia (USMILGP-Colombia) is 
technically a Security Assistance Organization (SAO) within the United States 
Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility.  However, based 
on their current mission set they should more aptly be called a “Joint Security 
Assistance & Cooperation Command – Colombia” (JSACC-COL).  Prior to 
construction and manning of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, U.S. Embassy-Bogotá 
was the largest American Embassy in the world with the largest SAO (MILGRP) 
in the world.  USMILGP-Colombia began to grow in 2000 with the implementation 
of Plan Colombia.  By 2002 with the implementation of Expanded Authority that 
permitted the use of counter-drug resources for counterterrorism, the MILGP 
began to exceed the size of SOUTHCOM’s other SAOs.  With the initiation of 
Plan Colombia, U.S. Security Cooperation grew in Colombia and the FID mission 
expanded from just Indirect Support to also include Direct Support (not involving 
combat operations). 
 
B. HISTORICAL COMPARISON: VIETNAM 
The two organizational comparisons that people often make with MILGP – 
Colombia are with the Military Assistance & Advisory Group (MAAG)/Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) of the 1960’s and the Operational 
Planning and Assistance Training Team (OPATT) of El Salvador of the 1980’s.  
The former comparison demonstrates how an SAO must be able to rapidly 
expand to meet the increasing level of U.S. support to a partner nation, the later 
example of El Salvador provides very useful insight as to how to effectively 
employ advisers.  In Vietnam, the MAAG as an advisory group served as the 
antecedent for the present day Planning Assistance and Training Teams 
(PATTs).  Similarly, the MACV was an early form of a SAO.  The MAAG was the 
first organization on the ground in Vietnam in 1955.  In May 1962, the MACV was 
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established to support the MAAG.  The 746 man USMAAG-Vietnam provided 
combat training and field support to the South Vietnamese.  In 1964, as the 
United States became more involved in Vietnam, the MAAG reached “a little over 
2,000” men and eventually merged into the MACV as combat units began to 
arrive.40  When the mission in Vietnam was limited to Indirect Support and Direct 
Support (not involving combat operations), the MAAG proved capable of 
maintaining C2.  As combat units were introduced into the country and the United 
States began Combat Operations, the MACV increased its structure to allow 
what was a SAO to grow into a full Army Headquarters capable of commanding 
divisions.  Although the scale of MACV was much greater than that of Colombia, 
MACV serves as a historical precedence for a SAO to grow into a combat 
command when it assumes all three components of Foreign Internal Defense, 
along with Security Cooperation.  Vietnam demonstrated the challenge of being 
able to quickly expand a SAO in order to handle the ramp up of U.S. support and 
troops.  
 
C. HISTORICAL COMPARISON: EL SALVADOR 
In 1998, when the MILGP Commander in Colombia went to discuss a 
future increase in U.S. military support in the wake of Plan Colombia, U.S. 
Ambassador to Colombia, Myles Brochette, declared, ‘I don’t want Colombia to 
become another El Salvador.’  The MILGP Commander replied, ‘but sir, didn’t we 
succeed in El Salvador?’41  U.S. military involvement in El Salvador (1984-1992) 
was closely monitored in light of America’s involvement in Vietnam.  To prevent 
the United States from embarking upon another Vietnam-style “slippery slope,” 
Congress enacted a 55-man “force cap,” a maximum allowable number of 
uniformed personnel allowed in country.  In Colombia, a 200-man force (later 
expanded to 400) was adopted based on U.S. experience in El Salvador.   
                                                 
40 U.S. Army Center for Military History. Vietnam (Washington, 2006), 2. www.army.mil  Last 
accessed 25 November 2006. 
41 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (23 September 2006). 
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U.S. military support to Colombia also parallels the earlier experience with 
El Salvador in the evolution of the mission from training a partner nation; to 
training and supporting; to training, supporting and advising.  The Combatant 
Command played similar roles in both instances by pushing staff support to the 
country as required.  In 1983, SOUTHCOM (then based in Panama) deployed a 
10-man team as a surge capability to help the Salvadorian JTF with their 
National Campaign Plan.42  This was very similar to SOUTHCOM’s deployment 
of planners to assist with development of Plan Colombia more than a decade and 
a half later.  The U.S. FID mission in El Salvador began as a traditional training 
mission for the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF).  In time, the idea developed 
that, by employing advisors at the Brigade-level, the United States could help the 
ESAF “seize the initiative while improving its performance in regard to human 
rights.”43  The mission in El Salvador began with support from conventional Army 
elements and eventually migrated to a Special Forces (SF) mission.  In 
Colombia, in contrast, U.S. Special Forces initially provided the preponderance of 
support vis-à-vis an Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC) with 1-2 Operational 
Detachment Bravo’s (ODBs), and 6-9 Operational Detachment Alpha’s (ODAs), 
In 2006, Colombia averages only 3 ODA’s and the PATT program which was 
filled with SF officers is now filled primarily filled with officers from the 
conventional combat arms branches.44  This is due to the fact that the continuing 
demands for special operations forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan dictates that 
an average of 85% of the United States’ SOF elements are deployed to the 
CENTCOM AOR.  The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM), General Doug Brown, claims, “We are missing a golden opportunity in 
Colombia right now.  Since the situation in Middle East has prioritized an average 
                                                 
42 Cecil Bailey, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador” (Ft. Bragg, December 
2004), 20. 
43 Bailey, OPATT, 18.    
44 This switch in the SF manning paradigm came in the wake of OEF/OIF.  The FID mission 
was actively sought out be the SOF community in peace time.  However, with on-going combat 
operations ensuing in the Middle East, Special Forces Groups now focus their efforts on direct 
action (combat operations). 
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of 85% of our SOF forces to the region, we can no longer dedicate the large 
contingent of SF forces from 7th Group that has historically been deployed to 
Colombia.”45  It has been recognized that Colombia needs more than just SOF 
elements to succeed.  Air planners, intelligence, communications, engineer, and 
logistical experts have well complimented the SOF elements to provide a holistic 
approach in Colombia.   
Unlike like the current Colombian PATT (and to a greater extent the 
USMILGP), the Operational Planning & Assistance Training Team (OPATT) in El 
Salvador was developed through an ad hoc system.  In El Salvador, it quickly 
became clear that the SF Mobile Training Teams, which focused on individual 
and collective unit training, did not provide the advisory support nor the continuity 
needed for the Salvadorian Brigades.  The SAO’s Engineering & Technical 
Services Specialist (ETSS) were expanded to fill the advisory roles for the 
Brigades because regulations allowed their personnel to be assigned for up to 
one year.  Although challenged in the 1980’s to find individuals who were both 
professionally and linguistically qualified, the U.S. advisors in El Salvador had a 
positive impact on the ESAF over the duration of the program.  One similar 
limitation, which is still to a degree controversial today in Colombia, was the 
restriction against U.S. military members accompanying ESAF units on 
operations was especially onerous to the advisers, who often cited the restriction 
as affecting not only their relationship with their counter-part but also their 
professional credibility.  The restriction was rooted in the trainer vs. adviser issue 
and in the ongoing concern of the U.S. Congress about the advisory role being 
the first step onto the “slippery slope” toward a full engagement of American 
forces in a ground war in Central America.46  But the restriction has benefits.  In 
Colombia, it has kept the conflict Colombian, which is particularly important in a 
region that is becoming increasingly anti-American.   
                                                 
45 GEN Doug Brown, Commander: USSOCOM. Interview by author, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. (7 November 2006). 
46 Bailey, OPATT, 24. 
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The ban on participating in operations is also in forced in Colombia.  DCM 
Milton Drucker paraphrases Ambassador Wood’s policy for avoiding combat: “if a 
U.S. soldier is present when shooting breaks out, he should run the other way!”47  
Drucker elaborates: “if U.S. troops have to do the fighting for the Colombians, we 
have lost. . . and if we lose a U.S. soldier, support for Colombia in the U.S. 
Congress will be destroyed.”48  The political implications of direct U.S. 
involvement in the Colombian conflict, along with the potential loss of American 
troops, is strongly echoed by the former Commander of the Colombian Armed 
Forces, General Carlos Ospina Ovalle: “I would love to have the U.S. advisors 
closer to our operations to observe, but we don’t want to lose the lives of U.S. 
soldiers on Colombian soil.  I am certain we would lose U.S. support [funding].”49  
Furthermore, such increased direct involvement would have both negative 
internal and external repercussions.  Most likely manifested through an 
information operations campaign conducted by one of the several leftist regimes 
in South America and political opponents of President Uribe within Colombia 
boasting a “U.S. Intervention in Colombia.”.  
The U.S. experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador offer a comparison for 
the U.S. military activities in Colombia, the latter more so than the former.  It 
appears that the lesson learned in El Salvador with regards to the quantity, 
location, and rank of advisers are applied today in Colombia.  However, the 
challenge of finding enough qualified advisers still persists.  Due to increase 
commitments and the need to provide subject matter expertise in non-SOF skill 
areas, the military has institutionally realized that soldiers from the conventional 
Army can advise just as well as SOF elements.  The Salvadorian model has 
limitations when applied to Colombia as the Colombian MILGP is much larger, 
with a much more diverse mission set, and more complicated command and 
                                                 
47 Milton Drucker, Deputy Chief of Mission-U.S. Embassy-Bogotá. Interviewed by author, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (27 September 2006). 
48 Ibid. 
49 General Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Former Colombian Armed Forces Commander. Interview by 
author in Spanish, (Bogotá, Colombia, 29 September 2006). 
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control issues.  Unfortunately, some of the same political issues that were 
present in El Salvador in the 1980’s, such as an aversion to the perceived loss of 
U.S. troops, are manifested through restricted movements and force caps in 
Colombia. These political constraints restrict the potential contribution of the 
MILGP to the fight in Colombia. 
 
D. THE HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY GROUP - COLOMBIA 
U.S. military involvement in Colombia began in 1934 during the brief 
border war with Peru.  In 1940, Washington engaged Colombia as part of the 
defense plan for the Panama Canal.  The United States’ first major impact on 
modernizing and professionalizing the Colombian military occurred during the 
Korean War.  According to Colombian security expert, Andrés Villamizar, “one 
can affirm that the modern Colombian Army was born through its participation in 
Korea.”50  Colombians began implementing U.S. doctrine at both the tactical level 
(patrolling) and operational level (staff planning).  By the 1950’s, Colombia 
received more Security Assistance than did any other Latin American country.51  
In 1955, the Escuela de Lanceros was founded in Tolemaida, modeled after the 
U.S. Army Ranger School. 
The triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 allowed Bogotá to argue 
plausibly that the formless and only marginally ideological conflicts between 
Liberal and Conservative militias and assorted bandit gangs that had 
characterized La Violencia (1948-1958) had transmogrified in the 1960s into a 
communist insurgency orchestrated from Moscow via Havana. U.S. fear that the 
Cuban Revolution might contaminate Latin America stimulated the Kennedy 
administration to combine the president’s Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el 
Progreso), a new regional development initiative, with counter-insurgency 
support for the Colombian military.52  In 1962, A U.S. assessment team 
                                                 
50 Andrés Villamizar, La Reforma de la Inteligencia. (Bogotá, 2004), 61. 
51 Russell W. Ramsey, Civil-Military Relations in Colombia 1946-65 (Leavenworth, 1978), 8. 
52 Doug Porch  & Chris Muller, Imperial Grunts Revisited (Monterey, 2006), 5-6. 
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concluded that lack of planning, coordination, poor utilization of resources, lack of 
equipment, reliance on static outposts, sporadic collection and untimely 
dissemination of intelligence, patchy civic and psychological action programs, 
and poor Army-Police coordination, combined with the country’s systemic 
problems of underdevelopment, put the Colombian military on the defensive. The 
U.S. response included a $1.5 million security package, including vehicles, 
communications, and helicopters; Military Training Teams (MTTs) to instruct 
Colombians on counter-insurgency; training soldiers and police at the School of 
the Americas in Panama; a revamping of both the military and police intelligence 
structure; and the creation of special operations units.53 These improved military 
capabilities helped the Colombian army to swell from roughly 6,000 soldiers in 
the 1940s to 65,000 by the 1960s. Sixty percent of the $40 million that 
Washington gave to Colombia between 1964 and 1967 went to the military and 
forty percent to civic action.54   These reforms culminated in Plan Lazo, a 
successful July 1962 offensive against the -- much depleted -- “independent 
republics” of the upper Magdalena valley, where the most ideological remnants of 
La Violencia had taken refuge.55 “We had to separate the gangs from the 
peasants, who saw the government as the enemy, and these bandits as their 
army,” former Army Chief-of-Staff General Alvaro Valencia Tovar remembered of 
Lazo. “We had to go after the leaders. Once these caudillos were killed, they 
were not replaced.”56 Psychological operations, acción cívico-militar, and 
intelligence were closely coordinated, while the military built health clinics, 
schools, water treatment facilities and linked isolated villages by road. The 
military offensive culminated in May 1964 with OPERATION MARQUETALIA, 
                                                 
53 Doug Porch  & Chris Muller, Imperial Grunts Revisited (Monterey, 2006), 5-6. 
54 Dennis M. Rempe, Counterinsurgency in Colombia: A US National Security Perspective 
1958-1966, (Miami, 2002), 126, 131-32. 
 
55 The original name was LASO, for Latin American Security Organization, but became LAZO 
which means noose or snare. Information provided by Valencia Tovar. 
56 Rempe, 137-152. 
 30
aimed at Manuel  Marulanda Vélez’s “communist republic.”57  By 1966, the 
insurgents who remained had been driven to remote areas, and Colombia 
seemed to have acquired a false sense of stability. 
By the 1980’s, U.S. support at both the tactical and operational level 
began to focus on the infamous Medellin and Cali drug cartels. With the demise 
of the notorious narco-trafficker Pablo Escobar in 1993, and a subsequent 
government campaign against the Cali cartel, the two largest consortia of drug 
trafficking organizations shattered.  However, the demand for cocaine continued 
to grow.  The traditionally politically-motivated insurgent groups, which already 
provided security in exchange for funding to the drug cartels, began to participate 
directly in the drug trade.  The result was a transition from politically motivated 
activities to full participation in all aspects of the drug trade not only to survive, 
but also to become among the richest criminal and insurgent organizations in the 
world.58  The increase in the scale of the Colombian problem required a huge 
increase in MILGP-Colombia in order to manage support within the context of the 
Andean Counter-Drug Initiative and Plan Colombia. 
 
E. U.S. MILITARY GROUP – COLOMBIA: 2000’S 
Since the inception of Plan Colombia in CY2000, MILGP-COL has grown 
significantly in terms of its mission and personnel in order to support the 
Colombian Government’s (GOC) fight against the narcotics trade itself, the 
terrorism it produces and an insurgency resourced by it.59 
MILGRP-Colombia was originally established along service lines with the 
exception of three functional sections (missions) – Training, Logistics, and the 
Planning Assistance Training Team -- that were added in 2003.60  The former 
                                                 
57 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, 1773), 73-78. 
58 Miguel Posada, “Terrorism in Colombia” (Washington, January 2002). 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/latin.20020121.posada.terrorismincolombia.html Last accessed 23 
February, 2006. 
59 US Military Group–Colombia, Reorganization Paper (Bogotá, May 2006), 1. 
60 Ibid, 2. 
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(Training), was created for a finite period of time in 2004-2005 to improve on a 
few challenged areas, which took about nine months to correct.   
 
            
Figure 3. U.S. MILGP - Colombia 2003 
 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Commander of MILGP-Colombia was 
“able to exercise command and control of all its assigned and deployed 
organizations.”61   USMILGP-Colombia had been operating under Congressional 
scrutiny and with much of the same restrictions that led to the FAA of the 1960’s 
and the 55-man limit on advisors in El Salvador in the 1980’s.  However, the 
events of September 11, 2001 allowed Bogotá to be embraced by the GWOT.  
The National Security Strategy written in 2002 recognized “the link between 
terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug 
trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups.”62  As a 
result, legislation created “Expanded Authority” for Colombia which allowed 
counter-drug funds to be utilized for counter-terrorist operations, which broke 
                                                 
61 US Military Group–Colombia, Reorganization Paper (Bogotá, May 2006), 1. 

















down an artificial, and to soldiers, a frustrating separation between counter-
narcotics interdiction and counter-terrorism operations existed.  This separation 
limited the ways in which certain funds could be allocated.  The Congressional 
cap on U.S. Military personnel/ contractors in Colombia previously set at 400/400 
was raised to 800/600 in 2005.  The increase not only marked a significant 
political gain in support for Colombia, but it also provided an opportunity to 
increase the level and quality of support the United States could provide the 
Colombian Military.  However, current operational requirements in the 
CENTCOM AOR have made it difficult to fill all billets to the maximum authorized 
levels, so that the benefits of the cap increase were lost to a degree due to the 
competing operational demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Several different factors have contributed to the wide variety of changes in 
Colombia’s politico-military situation which have served as the impetus for the 
subsequent expansion and reorganization of the MILGP over the years.  The 
combination of the military stalemate in Colombia between 1999-2000 and the 
September 11th attacks on the United States paved the way for expanded U.S. 
support for Colombia.  These events, which led to increased focus on the 
COLMIL’s capabilities, infused both additional support programs and augmented 
the existing programs.  Expanding programs usually take the form of additional 
dollars initially, while it can take several years for the personnel required to 
support the program to be authorized and deployed into the theater.  Increased 
funding without the necessary additional personnel to manage and supervise it 
caused problems in property and fiscal accountability in 2002.  These problems 
were discovered in 2003 when the new MILGP Commander arrived. 
 
F. U.S. MILITARY GROUP – COLOMBIA: 2006 
The current political and operational environment is overseen by the U.S. 
Ambassador, William Wood.  Ambassador William Wood strictly enforces 
Washington policy that regulates the activities and locations of U.S. troops in 
Colombia.  Currently, U.S. personnel can neither participate in nor even observe 
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Colombian combat operations and are restricted to “safe site locations” as 
determined by the MILGP CDR, the Ambassador, and SOUTHCOM.  As a 
consequence some U.S. military personnel complain that the Embassy is “risk 
averse.”  According to a senior U.S. officer in a non-attributional lecture at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), “if certain members of Congress knew what 
we weren’t doing in Colombia, I think they would be pissed.”  His comment 
referred to the fact that U.S. military personnel are prohibited from becoming 
more directly involved in operations in an attempt to gain information and 
capabilities which could facilitate a rescue attempt on the U.S. hostages.  With 
the long standing captivity of the three American DoD contractors (AMCITS) by 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Embassy fears 
that losing just one American soldier in the CNT fight might cause such an outcry 
in the United States that Congress might curtail U.S. support.63  Perhaps, this 
argument held more validity prior to the invasion and occupation of Iraq.  
However, with losses in Iraq approaching 3,000, at the time of writing, it seems 
unlikely that the loss several U.S. lives in Colombia would affect overall U.S. 
support.  In fact, the American public might not even notice.  However, it might 
affect support in the U.S. Congress, especially if U.S. personnel exceeded their 
mandate in Colombia.  Irregardless of the political sentiment in Washington, 
many members of both the DoS and the DoD agree that not becoming more 
directly involved in Colombia is the best policy decision for both the United States 
and Colombia.  In essence, the prevailing sentiment in Congress and the 
Executive Branch is that Colombia must do its own fighting.   
Since its creation, MILGP-Colombia has changed both in form and size to 
meet the evolving needs and scope of the U.S. security mission to the Colombian 
Military (COLMIL) and of U.S. foreign policy.  Aside from the traditional Security 
                                                 
63 On 13 February 2003, three U.S. government contractors (Marc D. Gonsalves, Thomas R. 
Howe, and Keith D. Stansell) were captured by the FARC after their Cesna 208 was shot down 
with small arms fire.  Two other personnel (Thomas J. Janis [US] and Luis A. Cruz [Colombia]) on 
the aircraft were summarily executed.  The captivity of these Americans has been quickly 
forgotten by the media, and they were referred to as the “Forgotten Hostages” on CBS 60 
Minutes on 8 OCT 2003.   
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Assistance role, MILGP-Colombia has taken on a myriad of other tasks to 
support the current Colombian counter-insurgency (CI) and counter-drug (CD) 
effort.  Such missions extend well beyond the traditional scope of Security 
Assistance and further expand the relatively new concept of Security 
Cooperation.  Unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, U.S. support to the COLMIL does not 
include Direct Action (DA). However, the MILGRP takes on many more missions 
than just training and equipping the COLMIL through traditional Security 
Assistance. 
As of May 2006, MILGRP-COL had 12 subordinate sections which 
incorporated the various elements that were created over the years to provide 
the necessary functions successfully to support the COLMIL.  In May 2006, 
MILGP-Colombia had the following configuration:   
 
 
            
































The expansion of the MILGP in the wake of Plan Colombia, together with 
“Expanded Authority,” has been accomplished by simply adding subordinate 
elements to the previously existing MILGP structure.  Most often, when the 
situation allowed based on ranks structure, personalities, and mission, new 
elements became subordinates to the pre-existing missions.  For instance, the 
Psychological Operations Element (PSE) was originally subordinate to the U.S. 
Army Mission and later reverted back to its traditional SOF C2 with the evolution 
of the SOC FWD Command Element.  However, not all additional elements 
added to the MILGP in recent years have proved to be a good fit.  For example, 
an unclear command and control relationship has undermined the ability of the 
MILGP to coordinate and synchronize the contributions of the Special Operations 
Forces deployed to Colombia and the Air Component Coordination Element 
(ACCE) to the overall Security Cooperation effort in Colombia.  MILGP-Colombia 
C2 proved inadequate to orchestrate this wide array of programs and missions 
that it is required to execute. 
  There is no developed Joint doctrine for such an effort.  It is 
being created in places like Colombia.  Current Joint doctrine that 
establishes command and control relationships approach it from 
a theater of war perspective - a perspective that fails to adequately 
address the unique USG interagency and combined nature of the 
security cooperation effort.64 
 
As new programs were added and additional missions undertaken, the 
need for other new sections grew to meet these changing and increased 
requirements of the COLMIL.  Often these new sections received their initial fill of 
personnel and augmentation from either SOUTHCOM, one of SOUTHCOM’s 
service components, or a stateside organization that was directly related to that 
function (i.e. U.S. Air Force South filling billets for the Air Component 
Coordination Element).  This manner of filling positions can create a stronger 
allegiance to the parent organization than to the MILGP and in the long-run result 
                                                 
64 US Military Group–Colombia, Reorganization Paper (Bogotá, May 2006), 1. 
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in parallel chains of command within the SOUTHCOM military architecture.65  As 
the doctrinal span of control (two to five subordinate elements) was exceeded, 
the C2 for the MILGRP Commander became difficult and the problem was 
exacerbated. 
 In June 2006, MILGP-Colombia underwent a review of its structure and 
command relationships.66  With the goal of better synchronizing operations (to 
include the increased intelligence and advisory roles) and providing the MILGP 
Commander with a better operational picture, a new organizational structure was 
proposed.  As a consequence, the current MILGP Commander, COL Kevin 
Saderup, returned to the basic principals by re-defining the MILGP mission, 
“Coordinates, Integrates and Synchronizes SOUTHCOM Security Cooperation 
Effort by Shaping Security Environment: 
• Strengthen COLMIL institutional foundation  
• Build Warfighting capabilities 
• Provide operational support to Campaign Plan 
• Exercise TACON for FP (RDA) and function as USDR 
• Conduct LNO support IAW other military activities 
• Provide administrative support to other US military organizations as 
required”67  
 
To accomplish these goals, it was determined that the MILGP must be able to 
perform seven functions.  These functions, in turn, should drive the subordinate 
components of the MILGP organization.  The function are: 
• Field Liaison – Training & Planning Assistance 
• Security Assistance – Training & Equipping 
• Logistics Support – Aviation Fuel, Riverine Fuel, Contract Airlift 
                                                 
65 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as “stove piping.” 
66 The original 2005 “MILGP Reorganization Plan” was originally drafted by the MILGP XO 
(LTC Carlos Berrios) with guidance from the MILGP Commander.   
67 US Military Group–Colombia, Command Brief (Bogotá, October 2006).  
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• Institution Building – Colombian Armed Forces (COLMIL) 
• Military to Military Engagement – Conferences, Seminars, Visits 
• Intelligence Support – Operational Support & Dissemination  
• Administration Support – FP, Contracting, Housing, Transportation68 
   
 In August of 2006, a series of video teleconferences between the MILGP, 
SOUTHCOM, and the Service Components took place with the goal of 
rationalizing MILGP organization.  Based on the proposed plan of June 2006, the 
SOUTHCOM Commander, GEN Bantz Craddock, provided the following 
guidance: 
• “Support the MILGP Commander’s effort 
• Do not degrade functional capabilities 
• No personnel growth”69 
 
As of October 2006, the MILGP re-organization concept included seven 
subordinate sections: Operations, Air Mission, Naval Mission, Army Mission, 
Logistics Support, Field Liaison Group, and Intelligence.  These elements are 
controlled by the MILGP Commander through the Deputy MILGP Commander, 
which is a newly created O6 position, that at the time of writing, has yet to be 
filled.  The MILGP Executive (XO) will answer to the Deputy Commander and is 
responsible for five specific elements that are commensurate with the elements 
that a typical Brigade XO would control.  Under the redesign, the traditional 
names of Army Mission (ARMIS), Navy Mission (NAVMIS), Air Force Mission 
(AFMIS), and Logistics Mission (LOGMIS), have subsequently been changed to 
Land Mission, Naval Mission, Air Mission, Logistics Support Group, respectively.  
Since the MILGP’s inception through the 2003 legislative expansion, the 
following is a comprehensive list of all of current MILGP-Colombia’s subordinate 
elements that were created to meet various Colombian military requirements. 
                                                 
68 US Military Group–Colombia, Command Brief (Bogotá, October 2006). 
69 US Military Group–Colombia, “MILGRP-COL Reorg” memo (Bogotá, Sept. 2006), 1. 
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Element          subordinate  to   MILGP Section 
 Airlift Scheduling      ACCE 
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP)  OPS CENTER 
Army Post Office (APO)      XO 
Civil Affairs (CA)       ARMY MISSION 
Communications Center      OPS CENTER  
Communications Support      LOG SUPPORT GROUP 
Contracting        XO 
Countermine/IED     ARMY MISSION 
Embassy Intelligence Integration Center (EIFC)INTEL 
Force Protection Detachment (FPD)    OPS CENTER 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)     LOG SUPPORT GROUP 
Information Operations (IO)     ARMY MISSION 
Intelligence Integration Teams (IIT)    INTEL 
JOINT MEDICAL SUPPORT   ARMY MISSION 
Military Justice/Human Rights    AIR MISSION 
Military Support to Public Diplomacy   NAVAL MISSION 
Motor Pool       LOG SUPPORT GROUP 
Operations Section      OPS CENTER 
Operations Planning Group (OPG)    FIELD LIAISON GROUP 
Personnel        XO 
Planning Assistance Training Team (PATT)   FIELD LIAISON GROUP 
Property Book Office      LOG SUPPORT GROUP 
Protocol        XO 
Traditional CINC Activities (TCA)    NAVAL MISSION 
Resource Management (RMO)     XO 
Rescue Coordination Center (RCC)    OPS SEC 
Rotary Wing Section (RWS)     ARMY MISSION 
Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) ARMY MISSION 
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The following sections were also created to meet specific requirements, but in 
essence remain under the control of one of SOUTHCOM’s Service Components 
and therefore, do not directly answer to the MILGP Commander:   
• Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE)  [AF SOUTH]* 
• SOF Operational Detachment C (ODC)   
• Special Operations Command Forward C2  (SOCC2 Fwd)  [SOC SOUTH] 
 
The proposed organizational structure remains a hybrid along both service and 
functional lines.   
 
 
   Represents a coordinating relationship 
            































































IV.   ASSESSMENT 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
MILGP Colombia has proven very effective in accomplishing its mission 
since the implementation of Plan Colombia.  According the former Commander of 
the Colombian Armed Forces, General Ospina, “The U.S. Military serving in 
Colombia is very professional and wants to help their counter-parts.  The MILGP 
is ready to do any job asked of them.  They know what’s going on.  They know 
the terrain.  And they are along side of us.”70  However, the MILGP has been 
inefficient from time to time in the support that has been provided.  This lack of 
efficiency comes from the fact that as funding increased, the appropriate 
personnel increases needed to track the resources (program managers, 
operations officers, budget managers, contracting officers, property book officers, 
etc.) were not increased at a commensurate rate.  MILGP-Colombia has 
habitually been undermanned considering the number of tasks undertaken by the 
MILGP at anyone time.  Operations in the CENTCOM AOR have accelerated the 
situation.  Physical workspace for the MILGP hasn’t increased to meet the 
expanding needs of the organization over the past 6 years.  As the MILGP 
Executive Officer, LTC Patrick Doty, explains, “Physical space is a key issue.71  
The increase in the MILGP’s personnel has not lead to a commensurate increase 
in our work space.  This problem is exacerbated by the inflation of the DoS ranks 
which has actually increased physical space requirements for the other 
interagency organizations.”72          
                                                 
70 General Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Former Colombian Armed Forces Commander. Interview by 
author in Spanish, (Bogotá, Colombia, 29 September 2006). 
71 Currently, MILGP personnel are allocated 4.3 square meters of work space in the 
Embassy, whereas the other interagency members have between 7.6 and 14.1 square meters 
per person.  The physical space shortage can appear at face value to be prestige issue, but the 
reality is the cramp quarters cause heat, safety, and health problems.  This in turn leads to 
productivity losses. 
72 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (29 September 2006). 
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Both the shortage of personnel and lack of adequate work space are 
relatively easy issues to resolve.  The greater challenges revolve around the 
ability to obtain and maintain quality individuals in the MILGP and command & 
control of subordinate MILGP assets.  Fortunately, these challenges have not 
prevented MILGP-Colombia from accomplishing its missions, but they have led 
to a lack of expediency, duplication of effort, and unnecessary wasted time for 
both the MILGP Commander and his staff.   But most importantly, the greatest 
factor that has caused MILGP Colombia to both succeed and suffer, has been 
leadership.  The MILGP’s key leaders, the MILGP Commander, the leadership 
exerted by SOUTHCOM and its service components have been responsible for 
accomplishing the miraculous, but also at times for contributing to ineffective 
bureaucracy.73  
 
B. PERSONNEL SELECTION 
Efforts to screen personnel assigned to Colombia both on permanent 
change of station (PCS) and on a temporary duty (TDY) basis must improve.  
Because on-going operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have stretched the U.S. 
military, USMILGP Colombia does not always receive neither the necessary 
quantity nor quality of personnel it needs to sustain continuity and provide quality 
support to the COLMIL.  The short duration TDY deployments of personnel to 
Colombia along with an overall lack of qualified personnel have hampered 
efficiency.  Of the 296 total personnel assigned to the USMILGP – Colombia at 
the time of writing, 192 are active duty military and 104 are DoD civilians or 
contractors.  Also, of the 296 total, 118 are permanent party (2-3 years) while the 
remaining 178 personnel are temporary duty personnel that are deployed from 3-
12 months.74  TDY personnel are provided through SOUTHCOM by the services 
with oversight by SOUTHCOM’s service components.  Active participation by the 
service component commanders (flag officers) to ensure that the MILGP billets 
                                                 
73 “Key leader” is defined in this context as an officer in the rank of O5 (LTC/CDR) or higher. 
74 TSgT Charlotte A. Llonza. Personnel Specialist: US MILGP-Colombia. Interview by author, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (27 September 2006). 
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get filled by the services has reduced some of the problem.  Unfortunately, not all 
service components are equally committed to resolving this problem.  U.S. Army 
South (USARSO), under the leadership of MG Jack Gardner, made huge strides 
in 2003-2004 in improving the Army personnel situation for MILGP Colombia. 
By maintaining bi-weekly direct communication with the MILGP 
Commander, COL Simeon Trombitas, MG Gardner kept abreast of not only the 
operations, logistics, and intelligence shortfalls of the MILGP, but also the 
personnel shortages by type and MOS.  USARSO made it policy that each U.S. 
Army soldier deploying to Colombia as an individual augmentee (through the 
World-wide Individual Augmentation System [WIAS] system) had to pass through 
the Headquarters and personally meet with the commander.  USARSO 
maintained a 3 person section in the Headquarters to track the individual 
augmentee process. This included TDY personnel filling both Plan Colombia and 
the Joint Planning Assistance & Training (JPAT) billets.  The USARSO 
Commander used the opportunity informally to interview the candidates who 
were being deployed to Colombia to ensure that they fully understood the 
importance of their mission.  However, by the time he interviewed each 
individual, they were practically getting ready to board the plane to Bogotá.  
Although the USARSO policy ensured that the administrative practices were 
enforced (theater/country clearance, shot records, weapons qualification), it did 
not afford the opportunity to reject an individual based on character, maturity, 
qualifications or allow enough time to find a replacement without having a 
significant gap for that position.  Therefore, it appears clear that a personal 
interview (not necessarily conducted by a General Officer) should be undertaken 
early in the assignment process to ensure the best candidates are selected.  This 
has since gotten worse as the Army no longer validates WIAS billets which have 
a Spanish language requirement.  When requisitioning personnel, the Army 
Mission must state that Spanish is preferred but not required and hope that 
through the informal personnel selection process with USARSO that Spanish 
speakers are selected and deployed.  “This is especially important due to the fact 
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that our LNOs and mission are physically embedded in the Colombian Army Staff 
and must coordinate directly with the partner nation daily,” claims the current 
Army Mission Chief.75  “The Army staff, possibly as a result of the need to rely on 
translators in Iraq and as a result of severe personnel shortages, may be 
forgetting the value of direct communication with coalition counterparts.”76    
   The Planning Assistance & Training Team (PATT) is a MILGP 
subordinate organization that can suffer when incoming personnel are not 
properly screened.  PATT personnel are not assigned through the WIAS system 
as well, but they are coordinated through Security Assistance and Training 
Management Organization (SATMO) in lieu of USARSO.  Until 2005, SATMO did 
not conduct an interview and a selection process, other than trying to ensure that 
incoming personnel meet the minimum language requirements (DLPT 2/2).  
However, the PATT in Colombia currently reviews each candidate’s ORB/ERB 
and calls each individual to conduct a telephonic interview.  The telephonic 
interview is as crucial as ensuring that the language requirement is met.  LTC 
Erik Valentzas, PATT Colombia Chief argues that, “by having my personnel chief 
talk with prospective advisors, we can quickly assess an individual’s mission 
focus, confidence in operating in a remote location, and determine if there are 
any major family issues that would hinder his performance.  We also conduct part 
of the interview in Spanish to validate the individuals DLPT score.”77  
Interestingly, some individuals who score a 2/2 (listening/reading) in Spanish, 
lack the ability to speak or write in Spanish.  Sometimes a native Spanish 
speaker, whose English is poor, will communicate better than a language school 
graduate who has scored a 3/3.  This is a systemic deficiency with the DoD’s 
language testing system.  On occasion, candidates will be rejected due to lack of 
qualification.  LTC Valentzas went on to claim, 
                                                 
75 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, 
(Bogotá, Colombia, 20 December 2006). 
76 Ibid. 
77 LTC Erik Valentzas, PATT Chief: US MILGP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (22 September 2006). 
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In the past we either accepted the individual being offered to us, or 
gapped the position for several months until another qualified 
candidate  was found.  In most cases, it was better to have 
someone with less than optimal qualifications today, than to try and 
wait for a better candidate that might not have come along for 
another 6 months.  Fortunately, we have gotten more pro-active 
and are able to find quality candidates in time so that positions do 
not need to be gapped.78 
 
The smaller an organization, the more important it becomes to recruit 
quality people.  It is difficult for a weak performer to hide in a small organization 
and it is equally as difficult for the rest of the organization to pick up the slack of a 
sub-standard performer when there is only a hand full of personnel.  When 
working with a partner nation in an advisory role, it is even more important to 
have individuals who will well represent not only their respective service, but also 
the United States of America.  For many members of our partner nation 
militaries, the only personal contact they will ever have with the U.S. military is 
their one-on-one dealings with our personnel serving in advisory roles.  
Commenting from his advisory experience in Iraq, CPT Bruno Zitto, summarized 
the negative impact of sub-standard advisors on the overall reputation of the U.S. 
Military, “they will always remember the dumb ass advisor and believe that the 
rest of us that come along later are just like him.”79   
  
C. COMMAND & CONTROL    
 1.  MILGP & MILGP Subordinates 
By far, the command and control relationships within MILGP – Colombia 
pose  the greatest organizational challenge.  Command and control (C2) for the 
MILGP Commander has become a challenge due to increased size, different 
service doctrines, different service cultures, different authorities based on 
                                                 
78 LTC Erik Valentzas, PATT Chief: US MILGP-Colombia. Interview by author, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, (29 April 2006). 
79 CPT Bruno Zitto. Interview by author. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (30 
October 2006). 
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funding, rating chains, and personalities.  The relationship between the organic 
service missions and the MILGP HQ’s vary depending on the service and 
individual personalities.  Historically, there has not been a problem between the 
MILGP HQ and the Army Mission (ARMIS) for three reasons:  First, the MILGP 
Commander is a U.S. Army 48B FAO O6 and the ARMIS Chief is a U.S. Army 
48B FAO O5.  Second, the MILGP Commander is a U.S. Army Officer 80% of 
the time (because Colombia is an Army centric operation).80  Lastly, roughly 
seventy percent (70%) of the MILGP Executive Officers served in the ARMIS 
prior to serving in the MILGP.  These factors fortify the MILGP-ARMIS 
relationship.  The relationship between the MILGP Commander and the other 
services has at times been more complicated.  Not only are both the NAVMIS 
and AFMIS Chiefs the same rank as the MILGP Commander, but they are also 
products of different service cultures as well.  Ironically the mission with the 
largest FMF, CD and IMET budgets, along with the most robust Security 
Cooperation activities, is the only service mission run by a Lieutenant Colonel – 
the U.S. Army Mission.    
 
 2. MILGP & Service Components 
SOUTHCOM and the MILGP enjoy the traditional senior/subordinate 
relationship.  However, the relationships between the MILGP and the service 
components are a little different.  SOUTHCOM’s service components -- U.S. 
Army South (USARSO), U.S. Air Force South (SOUTHAF), Marine Forces South 
(MARFORSOUTH), U.S. Naval Forces SOUTH (NAVSOUTH) -- are commanded 
by a two-star general, four-star general, three-star general, and three-star 
admiral, respectively.  Although the MILGP service components -- Army Mission 
(ARMIS), Air Force Mission (AFMIS), and Naval Mission (NAVMIS) -- don’t work 
for SOUTHCOM’s service components, there is a clearly an important 
relationship between them.  Service components provide each service mission 
                                                 
80 Sonia Castañeda Peralta, Executive Assistant: US MILGP-Colombia.  Interview by author. 
Centro Administrativo Nacional, Bogotá, Colombia, (27 Sep 2006). 
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(or should provide each service mission) with the reach back capability to provide 
the expertise and surge capacity that is often not present in a MILGP.  Much like 
the United States Army trains, equips, and serves as a force provider for the 
Joint Forces, SOUTHCOM’s service components fulfill similar roles for their 
Combatant Command.   
At times, service components will work special initiatives for SOUTHCOM 
through their respective service missions.  For example, USARSO received 
mission guidance from SOUTHCOM to help professionalize the Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps throughout Latin America.  In Colombia, 
USARSO accomplished this by helping to establish a Colombian Sergeants 
Major Academy.  This was a SOUTHCOM directive to USARSO that was worked 
through the ARMIS; and serves as an excellent example of how organizational 
synergy can accomplish the most daunting tasks.81   
Each service component should ensure that its goals for each country are 
synchronized with those of SOUTHCOM, the MILGP, and the respective service 
mission.  This is done through a service component review of the Theater 
Security Cooperation Plan.  Aside from synchronizing long term programs, it is 
just as important to synchronize day to day operations.  An example of where this 
has historically been problematic is the intelligence and air support arena.  The 
relationship between 12th Air Force (AFSOUTH), SOUTHCOM, AFMIS-
Colombia, ACCE-Colombia, and MILGP-Colombia are convoluted.  If the MILGP 
has an intelligence requirement, or even an in country airlift request, the process 
is as follows:   
1. MILGP subordinate develops an airlift requirement. 
2. Request goes to MILGP’s Airlift Coordinator (in ACCE) for scheduling. 
 
                                                 
81 The U.S. taught the first class to the COLAR, then the COLAR taught the second class 
under our supervision and had international students and other COLMIL services in attendance.  
Now SOUTHCOM just funds the program.  This is an excellent example of providing a capability 
to a Partner Nation which they eventually institutionalize.  Once the Colombians incur the costs, 
than the program will be truly nationalized. 
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3. Airlift Coordinator82 sends request to SOUTHCOM (Miami) 
4. SOUTHCOM validates request. 
5. Validated request sent to 12th Air Force (Tucson) for approval. 
6. Approved ATO sent back down to the ACCE (Colombia) for execution. 
 
This process is used to schedule all air assets, intelligence and the contracted air 
support provided by two small twin engine aircraft (Evergreen Aviation and 
OSACOM).  The contracted air consists of a set amount of flight hours per month 
for a CASA 212 aircraft.  The MILGP also has a set amount of hours for the 
OSACOM C-12.  In essence, a theater-wide airlift management doctrine is being 
used to manage two small transport aircraft.  “We are not a Theater of War.  The 
U.S. Air Force is trying to apply a theater of war strategy to Colombia.  The 
doctrine is interesting, but not relevant here in Colombia,” claims a mission chief 
who must endure this bureaucratic process everytime he conducts a COLMIL 
unit visit or sends one of his staff members to conduct an assessment or mission.   
 
3. MILGP & SOF 
The relationship between the MILGP and the Theater Special Operations 
Command (TSOC) – SOCSOUTH is complicated as well.  An unnamed Embassy 
source claimed, “command and control of SOF elements can be the most difficult 
challenge for the MILGP.”  The TSOCs receive Special Forces Operational 
Detachments (Charlie, Bravo, Alpha) to deploy in theater to conduct FID 
missions.  These ODC/B/A’s are under the operational control (OPCON) of the 
TSOC from the 7th Special Forces Group.83  When the Operational Detachments 
deploy into Colombia, they remain OPCON to the TSOC and fall under the 
Tactical Control (TACON) of the MILGP for force protection with OPCON further 
delegated to the SOC FWD in Colombia.  TACON allows the MILGP Commander 
                                                 
82 The MILGP Airlift Coordinator was originally part of the Logistics Mission, but is now part of 
the ACCE. 
83 7th Special Forces Group (7th SFG) is the Special Forces group that is aligned with the 
SOUTHCOM AOR. 
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to adjust the location of the ODA’s, but not adjust the mission set.  The MILGP 
influences the mission set executed in Colombia in advance via the Deployment 
Order process which requires MILGP and Ambassador approval as part of the 
staffing process.  The MILGP Commander, as the Risk Determination Authority 
(RDA), has force protection responsibility for all elements both permanently and 
temporarily assigned in Colombia.  The restrictions on movement that result from 
FP requirements are the biggest complaint for the SF elements in Colombia, 
many of which are accustom to the freedom of movement they had while 
deployed in the CENTCOM AOR. 
One concept that has been floated between the commands is to turn 
MILGP-Colombia into a Joint Task Force (JTF) or a Joint Special Operations 
Task Force (JSOTF).  Although the Colombians would not care as long as U.S. 
support did not languish, the idea is not acceptable to the Ambassador or the 
SECDEF, because primacy for the lead agency would change from the 
Department of State to the Department of Defense.  A JTF is normally organized 
to direct combat operations, which the United States is not conducting in 
Colombia.  Aside from not being politically acceptable, a JSOTF is even less 
justified since the number of Special Operations Forces has been reduced and 
the preponderance of support to Colombia is via conventional or non-SOF 
Security Assistance and Security Cooperation programs. 
4. Supported/Supporting Commander Relationship 
In an effort to streamline command and control within Colombia, 
SOUTHCOM is considering the implementation of a “Supporting/Supported 
Commander” relationship.84  As defined, the Supported Commander would be 
the MILGP Commander and all other Commanders would be the Supporting 
Commanders.  The MILGP believes that the Supporting/Supported Commander 
relationship “is the command relationship best suited to the complex and fluid 
joint environment in Colombia while preserving functional focus and providing 
                                                 
84 The support provided by the former USARSO Commander and the command climate that 
he created in USARSO in 2003-2005 with regards to Colombia, exemplifies the supporting 
commander concept. 
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more effective C2 systems.”85  This relationship structure is a step in the right 
direction, but its effectiveness will be dependent on the various commanders’ and 
mission chiefs’ personalities and attitudes.  The intent of this relationship is to 
avoid the doctrinal debates over OPCON/TACON relationships and to ensure 
that all Security Cooperation activities are synchronized and coordinated properly 
with the partner nation.   
 
D. LEADERSHIP   
Leadership is a key aspect in any organization.  Unlike conventional Army 
units which have a focus on a specific level of warfare (Battalion - Tactical Level, 
Corps/Division – Operational Level, Combatant Command - Strategic Level), the 
MILGP has subordinate elements that focus on all three levels.  This forces the 
MILGP Commander to focus on tactical issues (logistical re-supply, tactical 
training of Colombian units, maintenance issues, etc.), operational issues (FMF, 
fostering intra-service cooperation, COLAF air support to COLAR, etc.), and 
strategic issues (CMO support to the Colombian Center for Integrated Action, 
increasing the role of the Office of the Vice Minister of Defense).  This requires a 
versatile MILGP Commander who can not only focus on many things at one time 
(as expected out of all commanders), but also must be agile enough to jump 
back and forth between the levels for planning, advising, and decision making.  
LTC Mike Brown, US Army Mission Chief, explains, “Foreign Area Officers 
(especially MILGP Commanders) have to work with and balance the demands of 
three distinctly different customers: the partner nation, USG agencies, and the 
COCOM.” The ability of a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) to operate within this joint, 
inter-agency, multinational triangle will determine in the end his success or failure 
as a Soldier-Statesman.86   
 
                                                 
85 US Military Group – Colombia, “MILGRP-COL Reorg” Memo (Bogotá, September 2006), 1. 
86 Soldier-Statesman is the nickname given to the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) 
based on the nature of the mission they routinely execute. 
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Figure 6. The Foreign Area Officer Triangle 
 
1.  MILGP Commander 
The MILGP Commander’s position is authorized a U.S. Army Colonel - 
Foreign Area Officer (O6-48B).  However, the selection and approval authority for 
that specific billet resides with the SOUTHCOM Commander and therefore could 
be filled by whomever the COCOM Commander selects.  In recent years it has 
been filled by both Foreign Area Officers (Operations Support), as well as 
Special Forces and Ranger officers (Operations).  Success for past MILGRP 
leaders has not been a function of their branch or specialty, but rather a function 
of their experience and capabilities: 
• Fluency in Spanish 
• Prior SAO experience 
• Prior experience working with the COLMIL and LATAM militaries 
• Leadership experience 
• Combined experience at Tactical, Operational, and Strategic levels 
• Personality  
 
The current selection process which includes direct participation by the 
Combatant Command has resulted in the choice of highly-effective MILGP 
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Commanders in recent years.  However, due to the recently implemented Officer 
Professional Management System (OPMS), within 5-7 years it will be difficult to 
find an O6 Foreign Area Officer who has had tactical leadership experience 
above the Company Command Level.  Conversely, it will also be difficult to find 
an Operator who has experience in an SAO.87  This will present a challenge for 
the Army, which has become the model in the Joint community for producing 
well-rounded FAOs, to produce senior field grade officers with enough 
operational experience to lead a SAO that performs much more than just the 
traditional Security Assistance mission.  Finding the right officers to lead a 
Security Cooperation organization that supports a country at war will become a 
huge challenge.  
2.  MILGP Key Leaders 
 The MILGP Commander retains responsibility for selecting his subordinate 
leadership.  Ideally, SOUTHCOM provides several candidates which the MILGP 
Commander may interview and subsequently select based on their individual 
merit.  This holds especially true for Mission Chief billets, but not necessarily of 
the other O4/O5 staff billets.  But it is those Field Grade officers that make the 
preponderance of decisions and interact with the COLMIL on a daily basis.  
Therefore, their selection must be given special attention and only the most 
qualified and dedicated officers should be chosen.    
3.  Service Leadership 
 SOUTHCOM’s leadership and that of its service components also play a 
crucial role in the success of the MILGP.  First, component services must realize 
and accept their support role as a force and resource provider as one of the 
many responsibilities that they have.  SOUTHCOM’s Army Service Component 
                                                 
87 OPMS 21 assesses an officer into the Foreign Area Officer functional area at their 5-7th 
year of service.  Under the new regulations, officers assessed and trained by FAO branch will 
single track FAO assignments for the rest of their career.  Under the previous system, officers 
would dual track between their basic branch (Infantry, Armor, Engineer) and FAO branch, 
alternating assignments between the two.  This system produced Colonels that would become 
SAO Chiefs (MILGRP Commanders) with usually two assignments 4-7 years as a FAO and at 
least experience as a Battalion Executive Officer/S3 and even possible Battalion Command 
experience.   
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Command (ASCC), the United States Army South (USARSO), fully understood 
their supporting role which was instilled in the staff by their former commander, 
MG Jack Gardner.  He maintained contact with the MILGP Commander an 
average of twice a month via telephone and several more times via email, as well 
as conducting quarterly visits.  For fear of overburdening the MILGP, he was also 
willing to cancel his trips at the last minute should the MILGP deem his visit un-
necessary or was overburdened with other competing priorities.  MG Gardner 
made his staff responsive to the requests from the MILGP.  This required a shift 
in priorities for USARSO and was the opposite of the stereotypical higher 
headquarters that demands answers, reports, and statistics from its subordinates 
while providing limited support.  This was due to the fact that the USARSO 
Commander accepted the fact that his command, like all of the other service 
components, is a force provider and supporter for SOUTHCOM.  With a greater 
emphasis on pushing support to the MILGP, USARSO was able to assist the 
MILGP by: 
• Improving not only the number of personnel, but also the quality 
of personnel 
• Improving intelligence support 
• Streamlining logistical support 
• Expediting the requisitioning and tracking of standard army items 
purchased through ULLS-G for the COLMIL 
• Executing base support operations 
• Managing Force Protection construction 
• Establishing a Sergeant Major’s Academy in Colombia88 
  
USARSO became a model of how a service component should aggressively 
push support as needed.89  
                                                 
88 United States Army South. USARSO 5-Year Colombia Support Plan (San Antonio, July 
2004).  
89 This information was obtained first hand by the author while serving as the Aide de Camp 
for the Commanding General of USARSO from July 2004- October 2005. 
 54
 At the theater strategic level, the U.S. Southern Command plays a crucial 
leadership role by implementing guidance and directives from the National 
Command Authority from the President through the Secretary of Defense.  
SOUTHCOM serves as the link between Washington’s politico-military authorities 
and MILGP-Colombia.  One of several key leadership task that SOUTHCOM has 
recently accomplished was to lobby successfully for the increase of 
military/civilian personnel ratio from 400/400 to 800/600, respectively.90  
However, as previously mentioned, competing requirements in the CENTCOM 
AOR have made Colombia a strategic economy of force.  Therefore, the gains 
from SOUTHCOM’s legislative victory as been somewhat diminished. 
 
 
                                                 
90 Collen Cook, Colombia: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress, 
2006), 18. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
A. MILGP - COLOMBIA’S APPLICABILITY 
 Colombia’s success goes hand and hand with U.S. support.  In a world of 
constrained resources, we are forced to do more with less.  MILGP Colombia 
serves as a model for a Security Cooperation Organization that executes 
Security Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, and Security Cooperation 
missions.  Moreover, the FID mission in Colombia includes both the doctrinal 
Indirect and Direct Support (not involving combat operations).  The magnitude of 
the Security Assistance mission combined with breadth of activities that fall into 
the FID category and Security Cooperation umbrella, make Colombia a unique 
case.  Furthermore, it is likely that many other situations may arise in the next 10-
20 years that will require a U.S response that is similar to that of the Colombian 
model.91  
 
B.  JOINT SECURITY ASSISTANCE & COOPERATION COMMAND 
By implementing MILGP Colombia’s reorganization proposal, along with a 
few modifications, we can develop the doctrinal bases for a Joint Security 
Assistance & Cooperation Command (JSACC).  A JSACC, as an organization 
concept utilizes: 
• A traditional  Security Assistance Organization92 as a base 
o with service mission (ARMIS, AFMIS, NAVMIS) 
o with a more robust HQs (J1, J3) 
• Augmented with functional missions as required 
o Advisory (like a PATT or OPATT) 
o Intelligence (TAT, Fusion Cell, ITT, etc.) – J2 
                                                 
91 The Philippines is the only other recent historic example that comes close to Colombia.  
The major difference is that the Philippines had a Joint Task Force because of the solid 
intelligence revealing Islamic fundamentalists ties to the AO.  This distinction as a JTF alleviates 
the command and control issues because they are specifically defined. 
92 Sometimes referred to as a Security Cooperation Organization.  Can be any one of the 
organizations listed in Annex A. 
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o SOF (ODA/B/C, PSE, CA, etc.) 
o Logistic – J4 
• Hand selected leadership 
o JSACC Commander personally selected by COCOM 
Commander 
 Given full authorities similar to a JTF Commander 
 Considered equivalent of an O6 level command 
o Mission Chiefs personally approved by JSACC Commander 
 Nominative position for which officers compete 
 Considered equivalent of an O5 level command 
 
JSACCs must respect the partner nation’s sovereignty and work within the 
political setting established by the Embassy.  The JSACCs must be able to train 
(or coordinate for training), advise on operations, execute security assistance, be 
prepared to provide limited operational support (or coordinate for it), and execute 
the plethora of security cooperation tasks.  JSACCs should be modular and able 
to rapidly grow to meet expanding needs of a partner nation during times of 
crisis.  A JSACC should be stood up in a partner nation’s country as many years 
ahead of a projected contingency as can be predicted.  The JSACC should 
utilized the long range tools, such as MTTs, PEPs, DVPs, HCAs, along with 
Security Assistance funds to build capability, maintain access, and improve 
relations before a contingency ever arises.  When the contingency does occur, 
our partner nations will be well prepared and can be supported by the JSACC  
utilizing the short range tools available; JCETs, Airlift Support, Intelligence 
Sharing, etc.  DoD funding can then be leveraged to meet the immediate 
shortcomings of the partner nation in terms of non-lethal equipment.  A JSACC 
may be an economy of force operation in the pre-contingency timeframe when 
conducting indirect support.  The framework should allow for rapid expansion 
with the ability to command and control the various modules that may be added 
when the contingency occurs and direct support and direct support (not involving 
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combat operations) is required.  JSACCs will give the U.S. military an efficient 
organization that can operate in the “gray area.”  This “gray area” is best 
described by LTC Mike Brown: “We (the military) are not doing what we are 
doctrinally designed to do (in Colombia).  U.S. doctrine is geared to war or 
peace.  Colombia is in the middle somewhere between the two.”93 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS:  MILGP - COLOMBIA 
 1.  Rank Restructuring 
MILGP-Colombia should downgrade the rank of the Navy and Air Mission 
Chiefs to 05 (Commander and Lieutenant Colonel, respectively) to match that of 
the Army Mission Chief, who currently runs a much larger program than that of 
the other two services.  As a senior Air Force officer in the MILGP stated, “There 
is no need for an O6 Mission Chief.  You have an Army O5 that runs a bigger 
program than the other services.  Rank doesn’t seem to be a problem with his 
credibility with the partner nation.”  The O6 Air Force billet should be used to fill 
the Deputy MILGP Commander position.  This would create a more joint 
leadership environment.  The Navy Mission Chief billet could be swapped with an 
O5 Naval billets at SOUTHCOM.  This would give the SOUTHCOM an additional 
O6 billets in the HQs.  By lowering grades the pool of potential candidates is also 
increased. 
2. Unified Rating Chain 
Section chiefs in Colombia are rated by the MILGP Commander and 
senior rated by the SOUTHCOM Deputy Commander.  Those officers that do not 
work directly for the MILGP Commander (i.e. ACCE Chief) should have the 
MILGP Commander as the “Intermediate Rater.”  Wire diagrams are great, but 
people respond to those who rate them or control their budget, regardless of 
what doctrine says.  Such adjustments in the rating chains will only help enforce 
the Supported/Supporting Commander relationship. 
                                                 
93 LTC Mike Brown, Army Mission Chief: US MILGRP-Colombia. Interview by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (29 September 2006). 
 58
3. PEP Re-alignment  
One specific change to improve the current reorganization model and 
improve chances for continued success would be to move the operational 
Professional Exchange Program (PEP) positions from the various missions to the 
Field Liaison Group (FLG).  The six current PEPs are supported by their 
respective missions (Army and Naval).94  The AFEAU PEP (along with any 
operational-type PEPs that may be added in the future) should move under the 
control of the FLG (formerly known as the PATT).  A more radical concept would 
be to move the remaining institutionally oriented PEPs under the FLG as well, 
however, this contradicts the current paradigm whereas each service is 
responsible for institution building.  Consolidation under the FLG, whose sole 
focus is advising, would further synergize the institutional advice given to the 
COLMIL.  The FLG has a robust enough personnel and operations section that 
they could easily manage the additional advisors.  Furthermore, the PEPs would 
be able to go through the same thorough indoctrination that all of the PATT 
advisors experience.  A consolidation of the PEP’s would also reduce the current 
span of control, which is already been extended beyond its doctrinal limits.  
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS:  USSOUTHCOM 
1.  Supported/Supporting Commander Relationship 
SOUTHCOM must continue to support and enforce the 
Supported/Supporting Commander relationship within the MILGP.  This can be 
facilitated by allowing the MILGP Commander the ability to interview and hand 
pick the future mission chiefs, especially the ones of commensurate rank (should 
Mission Chief positions not be downgraded to O5).  First and foremost 
SOUTHCOM must ensure that all service components realize the importance of 
their supporting role for the MILGP.  They must enforce the command 
                                                 
94 The Army Mission currently has three PEPs (Lancero School, NCO Academy, and CT unit).  The 
Naval Mission currently has three PEPs as well (Naval Academy, JTF Caribe, Covenas).   
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relationships and ensure that the Supporting Commanders are supporting the 
Supported Commander as specified.   
2. Tour of Duty Lengths 
Tour of duty lengths must be increased.  Continue to improve on continuity 
by extending the quality individuals and seeking longer-term TDY/TCS/PCS 
assignments.  Since Colombia is a hazardous duty location, currently permanent 
personnel are assigned for two years (with an option for an additional one year 
extension).  The problem lies with the temporary duty personnel.  The U.S. Army 
fills the PATT temporary change of station (TCS) positions for one year and the 
Plan Colombia and JPATT TDY positions for six months.  The Navy fills 
temporary positions for four to six months and the Air Force fills for four months.  
Understanding the Air Force’s concept of expeditionary manning, they must 
come to the realization that in four months, even the best airman can accomplish 
very little.  This offers an example of how cultural differences between service 
personnel policies have a direct impact on a joint organizations’ mission 
effectiveness.  According to one of the Mission Chiefs, “based on my experience 
it takes 4-6 months for the average TDY person to become effective due to the 
non-traditional military environment.”  
SOUTHCOM should bring the service manning disparity, to include the 
drawbacks of the Air Forces’s (4-month) Expeditionary concept, front and center 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  Not only does the current disparity in 
deployment times cause friction and animosity between the services, it also 
detracts from the ability of a Joint organization to accomplish its mission.  This is 
an opportunity for SOUTHCOM to exercise not only the leadership responsibility 
it has for MILGP-Colombia, but also it is  an opportunity to raise an operational 
problem that is not only affecting SOUTHCOM, but all of the other COCOMs 
actively engaged in the GWOT as well. 
3. Establish a JSOA 
To mitigate the command and control issue with the TSOC, a Joint Special 
Operations Area (JSOA) should be delineated in the appropriate areas of 
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Colombia to allow the SOF community the unrestricted freedom of movement 
that they require in order to allow them more unfettered movement in order to 
support all types of SOF activities.  This would eliminate the MILGP 
Commander’s RDA responsibilities for only the SOF elements operating in the 
designated area.  It would not mean, however, that the SOF element would have 
to control all U.S. elements in that area and that other MILGP elements could 
move through that areas as per SOP based on a CONOP approved by the RDA 
(MILGP Commander). 
4. Delegation of Air Tasking Authority 
The MILGP Commander should be given authorization to control the 
aircraft in his country.  The ACCE should plan and task all air requirements 
based on the MILGP Commander’s approval (approval authority should not be 
delegated any lower than the MILGP Commander).  The ACCE should inform 
both SOUTHCOM and 12th Air Force of all requirements and the planned 
missions to support those requirements.  Naturally, SOUTHCOM and 12th Air 
Force could influence missions that they don’t see as valid based on exception. 
5. MILGP Parity with DoS 
SOUTHCOM leadership should engage the Ambassador in regards to the 
work space allocation for the MILGP within the Embassy compound.  The 
disparity in average square footage of workspace should be sufficient justification 
to gain additional facilities.  The fact that some military officers in the Embassy 
feel that the Embassy’s senior leadership looks at the MILGP as a “red-headed 
step child,” makes this a great issue for SOUTHCOM to work on the behalf of the 
MILGP.  Resolving such parochial issues are exactly the type of interagency 
problems that must be dealt with to succeed in an environment such as a 
Colombia. 





E. RECOMMENDATIONS:  DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
1. FAO In-Country Training Positions 
The Department of Army G3 (FAO Proponent), should allocate two In-
Country Training positions for Colombia.  These positions could be utilized by the 
MILGP to fill operations billets in the ARMIS or advisor positions in the PATT 
based on the MILGP’s needs and the officer’s operational skill sets.  Based on 
the overwhelming requirements of the U.S. Army and fact that we have unfilled 
billets in commands that are supporting the GWOT, FAO proponent must re-
allocate the traditional school-type billets in other Latin American Countries in 
order to fill operational needs in Colombia.  One counter argument to this idea is 
that it may cause a political problem with another partner nation that may loose 
their ICT billet.  The counter to that argument is that most countries realize that 
the United States is at war, so that the billet may remain unfilled temporarily.  The 
United States could also allow that partner nation to continue to send personnel 
without the United States reciprocating.  Another argument is that the FAO 
trainee will not receive the regional experience that ICT aims to provide.  
Therefore, after 10-12 months of ICT in Colombia, officers could be given a TDY 
budget and allowed 30-60 days to conduct regional travel.  Creating ICT billets in 
Colombia will not only benefit the MILGP by providing additional ambitious young 
officers, it will give 48B FAO trainees the opportunity to experience 
SOUTHCOM’s main effort, increase language skills by working with the COLMIL 
directly on a daily basis, establish long term personal relationships with one of 
SOUTHCOM’s strongest partner nations, and help alleviate the personal 
shortfalls in the MILGP. 
 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS:  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
1. Implementation of the JSACC Concept  
The Department of Defense should consider the formation of Joint 
Security Assistance & Cooperation Commands (JSACCs) as an economy of 
force tool to help develop partner nations’ capabilities, to establish and maintain 
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long term mil-mil relationships, and to set the conditions for success of potential 
U.S. operations in specific countries.      
2. Develop Joint Security Cooperation Doctrine 
Currently, U.S. doctrine exists on both ends of the spectrum; for combat 
operations and peacetime training and administration.  DoD must follow suit after 
eliminating the organization gap by eliminating the doctrinal gap that exists by 
creating a comprehensive joint doctrine for providing the full-spectrum of 
assistance and support to a partner nation that falls in the “gray area.” 
 3. Increase Personnel to Colombia 
 DoD should leverage the increase in the Congressional mandated 
personnel cap.  By doing so, DoD would be reinforcing success.  With possible 
reduced troop deployments in CENTCOM, an additional 90 personnel (to include 
SOF) assigned to Colombia in the appropriate specialties and grades would 
provide much needed support.  Because of the COLMIL’s increased competency 
and propensity to work with the United States, each individual working in 
Colombia can potentially accomplish much more when compared to their 
potential working with another partner nation. 
SOCCOM should deploy at least three more ODA’s back to Colombia, 
bringing the average in country to six ODA’s under an ODB.  This should be the 
bare bones minimum.  As the current SOCOM Commander admitted, “we are 
missing a golden opportunity in Colombia right now.”95 
4. Improve Service Personnel Augmentation Systems 
Force the component services to develop an augmentation system that 
forces each service to search out the best personnel for specific jobs that require 
a language or experience with a specific country.  The burden should be taken 
away from the MILGP and PATT to search out the best qualified candidates.  
Analyzing the U.S. Army’s system for providing personnel on a temporary basis 
to Colombia reveals a simple solution for increasing the quality of those 
                                                 
95 GEN Doug Brown, Commander: USSOCOM. Interview by author, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. (7 November 2006). 
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deployed.  Currently, MILGP – Colombia receives its Army temporary duty 
augmentees (TDY) through WIAS.  WIAS selects personnel based on the names 
submitted by units tasked by the Army Staff.  For instance, if the MILGP requests 
a Medical Logistics Specialist (91J30), WIAS will submit a tasking requirement to 
the Department of the Army G3, which in turn passes the requirement to U.S. 
Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).  FORSCOM then tasks a unit that has that 
specific MOS.  That unit will hopefully find a volunteer with the language skills 
necessary to fill the billet, although by regulation they are not required to do so.  
However, there may be another Army unit that has a more qualified individual 
with the desire to deploy to Colombia.  However, they remain uninformed due to 
the way the system functions.  The positions should be advertised on a service 
website and open service wide to allow volunteers to submit their names through 
their Major Command (MACOM) to WIAS for selection.  The billets in Colombia 
must be treated as a nominative position for which you must compete, much like 






































APPENDIX  A.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
Abbreviation Title  Locations  
JUSMAG Joint US Military Advisory Group 1 Thailand   
JUSMAG Joint US Military Assistance Group 1 Philippines   
JUSMAG Joint US Military Affairs Group 1 Korea   
      
USMAAG 
US Military Assistance Advisory 
Group 2 Dom Rep Peru  
MAP Military Assistance Program 1 Jordan   
MDAO Mutual Defense Assistance Office 1 Japan   
MILGP Military Group 9 Colombia El Sal Argentina 
  (or 
MILGRP)   Ecuador Guatemala Honduras 
   Bolivia Chile Venezuela 
USMLO US Military Liaison Office 7 Belize Brazil Caribbean 
   Haiti Jamaica Guyana 
   Trinidad & Tobago  
NLO Navy Liaison Office 1 Bahamas   
ODC Office of Defense Cooperation 43 Uruguay (Europe & Africa) 
ODR Office of Defense Representation 2 Costa Rica Pakistan  
      
OMC Office of Military Cooperation 5 Bahrain Egypt Oman 
   Yemen Kuwait Afghanistan
SAO Security Assistance Organization 1 Ethiopia   
SAAO 
Security Assistance Augmentation 
Office 5 Kazakhstan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan 
   Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
USLO US Liaison Office 5 Kenya UAE Qatar 



































APPENDIX B.  PLAN COLOMBIA 
 
A. PLAN COLOMBIA DEFINED 
Depending on whom you talk to, Plan Colombia has taken on several 
different meanings over the years.  Defining Plan Colombia from the various 
aspects of the different actors involved is a difficult task in itself.  An even more 
challenging task is assessing the effectiveness and impact of Plan Colombia, to 
include U.S. support for the program.  With the official end of Plan Colombia in 
December 2005, the Colombians are currently working on a continuation 
strategy.  The biggest question is the future level of U.S. support.  Many factors 
will come into play as to the extent of support the United States will provide 
Colombia in the future.   
Plan Colombia is the, “Colombian national plan designed by President 
Pastrana in 1999 to strengthen the State, achieve peace and prosperity, and fight 
against the illegal drug trade.”96  The concept behind Plan Colombia was first 
introduced to the Colombian public in a speech made by President Pastrana on 
the eight of June 1998 at the Tequendama Hotel in Bogotá.  Described by some 
as a sort of “Marshall Plan” for Colombia, “The Government of Colombia 
developed Plan Colombia as an integrated strategy to meet the most pressing 
challenges confronting Colombia today -- promoting the peace process, 
combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian economy, and 
strengthening the democratic pillars of Colombian society.”97  Although Plan 
Colombia is a well integrated national strategy, the focus has been on counter-
drug operations.  “When we worked on Plan Colombia, it had nothing to do with 
killing FARC, it had a counter-drug (CD) focus,” recalls PATT Chief, LTC Erik  
                                                 
96 SOUTHCOM J5, “Synopsis of Plan Colombia” (Miami, January 2002). 1. 
97 U.S. Department of State, “Support for Plan Colombia” (Washington, August 2006). 
http://www.dos.gov Last accessed 19 August 2006. 
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Valentzas.98  However, international support for Plan Colombia has been weak 
from the beginning (see Section E). 
A Colombian government attempt to negotiate with the FARC between 
1998 and 2002, which included the concession of a “Zona de Despeje” (a 
territory the size of Rhode Island) to the guerrillas as part of the peace 
negotiations, failed when the FARC used the cease fire to procure arms, 
increase coca production, and take more hostages.  After committing what at the 
time was considered by some as one of the greatest strategic errors ever in 
Colombian history, President Andres Pastrana redeemed himself and his 
administration with the development of Plan Colombia.99  In 1999, the 
Government of Colombia implemented a six-year comprehensive plan to restore 
security, strengthen the justice system, eradicate coca cultivation, develop the 
infrastructure and economy, and restore social order and peace in Colombia (see 
Annex B for exact timeline).  This plan became known as Plan Colombia.100   
 
B. FIVE PART INSTITUION BUILDING PLAN 
Six years after the implementation of Plan Colombia, many 
misperceptions about its origins, scope, and purpose still persist.  First and 
foremost, Plan Colombia is not a U.S. plan.  The GOC requested the assistance 
of USSOUTHCOM with the development and financing of the plan.  But Plan 
Colombia is a Colombian plan, written and executed by Colombians.  The United 
States agrees with goals of Plan Colombia, however, there has been a slight (but 
not wholly unexpected given the multinational nature of the effort) political 
                                                 
98 LTC Erik Valentzas, former SOUTHCOM J5 Desk Officer.  Interviewed by author, Bogotá, 
Colombia, (23 September 2006). 
99 In reality, the concession of the Despeje to the FARC bought Pastrana time and showed 
the international community that the FARC was not serious about negotiations.  As a result, the 
FARC lost support in Europe and the United States realized that their support was truly needed.  
The biggest difference between those negotiations and those that may take place in the near 
future is the fact that the Colombian Government attempted to negotiate from a position of 
weakness, whereas future negotiations would be from a position of strength due to the recent 
success brought about through Plan Patriota and the counter-drug effort. 
100 U.S. Department of State, “Support for Plan Colombia” (Washington, July 2006). 
www.state.gov Last accessed 15 July 2006. 
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disagreement between Colombia and the United States as to the priorities of the 
goals (see Annex C).  A second misperception is that Plan Colombia is strictly a 
military plan to defeat the illicit drug industry or narco-terrorism.  The current 
military campaign plan, Plan Patriota, which seeks to reclaim control of parts of 
the country currently occupied by guerrillas is of paramount importance to the 
success of Plan Colombia. But is only one element of a comprehensive strategic 
plan to improve the country as a whole.  The simple truth is that security is a 
necessary pillar for successful  post-conflict reconstruction, without which other 
social and economic programs cannot be achieved.  This concept has been 
reinforced in Iraq where post-conflict nation building has been hampered by a 
lack of internal security.  
 Plan Colombia’s comprehensive institution building strategy has five 
specific facets: 
• Peace Process 
• Economic Reform 
• Counter-Drug Policy 
• Democratization & Social Reform 
• Justice Reform 
1.  Peace Process 
The Peace Process recognizes the role that the international community 
as both a moderator and a potential source of financial support.  But, aside from 
the United States, the international community has provided little financial 
support.  A few countries, notably Cuba, have attempted to facilitate the peace 
process between the Government of Colombia and the AUC and ELN.  However, 
the peace process has taken a back seat to the Colombian’s emphasis on taking 
the fight to the guerrillas.  In order for the peace process to succeed and 
negotiations to have a lasting impact, the Government of Colombia realizes that 
the must reduce the military capabilities of the guerrilla and re-establish territorial 
control in order to negotiate from a position of strength.   
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“The armed forces and police must continue to strengthen themselves.”101  
This is a challenge for two institutions (the military and police) that both fall under 
the Ministry of Defense and compete for the same resources, to include U.S. 
funding.  An on-going debate exists as to the actual impact of the exorbitant level 
of U.S. funding on the pre-existing wedge between the Colombian National 
Police (CNP) and the Colombian Military (COLMIL).  Irregardless, the structural 
differences between the two services, which have led to many coordination 
problems at the tactical level and have caused fratricide on more than one 
occasion, undoubtedly need to be addressed.  Former Armed Forces 
Commander, General Carlos Ospina Ovalle sees separate but complementary 
missions for the two services: “The police work for mayors, they defend people.  
They are very important for area control.  But the police do not engage in 
community policing.”102  This paradigm will have to change when the war comes 
to an end.  In fact, if the police cannot transform from a militarized force to a 
community focused force faster than the demobilized insurgents can transition 
from a guerrilla element to a criminal network, then many of the benefits of AUC 
demobilization will be wasted.  A solution might begin with the transfer of the 
Colombian National Police from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the 
Interior, once negotiations with the last remaining terrorist organization begin. 
2.   Economic Reform 
Plan Colombia’s economic component consists of fiscal restraint, 
macroeconomic stabilization, and the promotion of trade.  Trade, to include a 
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, is the cornerstone of 
Colombia’s economic policy.     
  
                                                 
101 Government of Colombia, “Plan Colombia” (Bogotá, Colombia, 1999).  
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia_colombia_101999.html Last 
accessed 26 November 2006. 
102 General Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Former Colombian Armed Forces Commander. Interview 
by author in Spanish, Bogotá, Colombia, (29 September 2006). 
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3. Counter-Drug Strategy  
The most controversial facet of Plan Colombia is the counter-drug section, 
which has six goals.  The principle aim was to reduce coca cultivation by 50% by 
2005.  The other key objectives of the counter-drug strategy included: 
• Integration through Jointness, professionalization, and modernization 
of the COLMIL 
• Integration of a counter-drug strategy into regional and international 
efforts 
• Neutralizing terrorist organizations’ financial system 
• Combating agents of violence and promoting respect for human rights 
• Strengthening and expanding alternative development programs 
 
Colombia has sought to accomplish these objectives through a three phase 
strategy that sought to regain territorial control of the country once the capital and 
major metropolitan cities were firmly in the government’s hands.  The three 
phases were geographically delineated and timelines set:  
• I.  Southern Region (Putumayo, Caqueta, Amazonas): 1-2 years 
• II. Southern/Central (Guaviare):    2-3 years 
• III. Country wide       3-6 years 
 
The CD strategy attempts to define the roles and missions for the Armed Forces.  
The Colombian Military is responsible for pursuing illegally armed groups, the 
Colombian National Police is responsible for pursuing drug traffickers, while the 
Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) – the Colombian equivalent of 
a combined FBI, DEA and CIA investigates financial crimes.  
4.   Democratization and Social Development 
 The Democratization and Social Development component of Plan 
Colombia seeks to accomplish three main objectives, which in the end will apply 
pressure on insurgent groups.  First, make the government, both federal and 
local, more accountable through anti-corruption programs.  Second, emphasize 
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respect for human rights by both the government and by the insurgents.  Finally, 
construct a national plan for alternative development that will allow for the 
voluntary abandonment of illicit crops.  These programs will regain the support of 
the rural populace which has turned to groups like the FARC to market illicit 
crops because the alternatives are often non-existent.     
5. Justice Sector Reform 
Justice reform targets five objectives that will be accomplished through 
multi-agency cooperation that ensures fairness, accessibility, and restores public 
confidence.  The five elements of justice reform include: 
• Investigate and prosecute crimes and securely incarcerate convicted 
criminals 
• Deprive criminals of illegal profits (asset seizure) 
• Combat contraband & strengthen interdiction 
• Eliminate corruption 
• Reduce demand for illegal substances 
 
Justice issues and an overall weakness in the Colombian judicial process have 
proven a source of tension in U.S.-Colombian relations.  Due to weakness in the 
Colombian judicial system, Colombia and the United States established an 
extradition treaty in 1982.  Although the 1991 Constitution banned extradition, 
this provision was changed in 1997.  Since then, the biggest fear of Colombian 
narco traffickers and insurgents has been that of extradition to the United States 
for trial, where they know their freedom can not be bought. 
 
C. PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The Colombians courted international support by arguing that the drug 
problem was international and not Colombia specific.  But to the dismay of 
Colombia, the Europeans reneged on their promise to provide substantial 
support.  As one U.S. official in Colombia claimed, “the Europeans promised 
support to save face, they never had any intention of supporting Colombia with 
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anything significant.”  The United States began to support Plan Colombia with 
multinational engagement and counter-narcotics operations not only in Colombia, 
but in neighboring Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil.  In the wake of 11 
September 2001, U.S. support to Plan Colombia broadened after Congressional 
legislation allowed for “Expanded Authority to use counter-drug funds for counter-
terrorism.”103  The Expanded Authority legislation also removed any prior 
distinction between narco-trafficking and terrorist activities, leading to a more 
widespread usage of the newer term“narco-terrorism” to refer to the threat in 
Colombia.   
Across the eastern border, President Hugo Chavez, the eccentric yet 
democratically re-elected president of Venezuela, claims that “Plan Colombia is 
the United States plan to build up the military might of Colombia in preparation 
for an all out cross-border attack into Venezuela.”  While more level-headed 
Venezuelan military officials disagree with the possibilities of an all out invasion 
of their country, nevertheless they believe that Plan Colombia does serve as a 
destabilizing force in the region.104 
 
D. ASSESSMENT OF PLAN COLOMBIA    
The following section assesses Plan Colombia by analyzing the results 
achieved by each of the five pillars.  The results vary with the greatest success 
coming from the counter-drug strategy.  The peace process initially made the 
least progress, but negotiations with the AUC in 2005 were extremely successful.     
1.  Peace Process 
The Peace Process has made significant progress since the start of Plan 
Colombia.  Colombia has a functioning individual demobilization program 
(rewards program) for those insurgents willing to turn themselves in accordance 
with the 2005 Justice and Peace Law.  Former combatants are relocated (to 
include families), retrained in a civilian occupation, and reintegrated into 
                                                 
103 Arkin, Code Names, 98. 
104 Omar Pina, “Plan Colombia – How US Military Assistance Affects Regional Balance of 
Power,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, (June 2006). 
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Colombian society.  Over 40,000 members of the FARC, ELN, and AUC have 
participated in this program.  The largest strides in group demobilization have 
occurred with the AUC.  Colombia has demobilized 31,000 members 
(paramilitaries) affiliated with the AUC as of August 2006.105  However, the 
Colombian Supreme Court has caused setbacks in the process by over riding 
Uribe’s terms of punishment for former combatants.  The Supreme Court, along 
with some NGO’s, thought punishment was too light and safeguards too lax.106  It 
may appear to the insurgents that the Colombian Government is reneging on its 
promises to the AUC.  The AUC demobilization is very important in setting the 
conditions for potential ELN and FARC demobilization.  Therefore, the issues 
with punishment for former combatants must be solved.  Colombia has leveraged 
Cuba to broker talks between the Government of Colombia and the ELN, a sign 
of openness to the international community.  Progress in starting negotiations 
with the FARC have been stalled by a series of bombings and attacks throughout 
Colombia in 2006.      
2.   Economic Reform 
The progress made by both the Uribe and Bush Administrations towards 
an Andean Free Trade Agreement have been recently stalled in the United 
States by the 2006 elections, which gave control of the 110th Congress to the 
Democrats.  “A group of senior Democrats this week called on Susan Schwab, 
the United States Trade Representative, to re-open negotiations . . . and insert 
new clauses that would toughen labor and union rights.107  The failure of a 
Democratic Congress to pass a Free Trade Agreement with Colombia will hinder 
the economic recovery plan for Colombia.  Ironically, after spending billions in aid 
for Colombia’s security, the United States could potentially undercut their sunk 
costs by failing to support the economic programs which can now finally be 
achieved as the security situation finally begins to improve.  However, the 10-
                                                 
105 Collen Cook, Colombia: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress, 
2006), 5. 
106 Ibid, 6. 
107 The Economist, “Snubs and Opportunities” (London, 1 December 2006), 37. 
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year strategic economic plan, which includes the expansion of trade, will only 
come to fruition if the security situation improves enough to calm the fears of 
foreign investors.      
 3. Counter-Drug Strategy 
Although the counter-drug strategy for Plan Colombia set specific 
eradication goals and emphasizes counter-drug operations, it has served as the 
nucleus of a security strategy that has morphed into a larger counter-narco 
terrorism strategy.  Combined U.S./Colombian eradication efforts continue to set 
record numbers every year, but some non-governmental organizations contend 
that U.S. counter-drug policy has been ineffective and that a lack of sustainable 
economic alternatives continues to hamper progress.  With the growing 
acceptance of the idea that drug runners and guerrillas can be considered as 
one, Plan Colombia’s counter-drug strategy also created objectives for increasing 
the capabilities of the Colombian Armed Forces (to include the National Police).  
The Armed Forces (to include the CNP) have expanded and strengthened 
significantly.  However, work remains to be done to transform the COLMIL into a 
truly Joint force.      
Plan Colombia specifically set out to reduce coca cultivation by 50% by 
2005.  The Government of Colombia claimed that by the end of 2004, they had 
eradicated 50.8% of the coca in Colombia, reducing crops from 160,120 hectares 
to 80,350 hectares.108  This is not as straight forward of a metric as one might 
think.  First, the United States, which uses remote sensing to count cultivated 
areas, has not consistently surveyed the same areas of Colombia on an annual 
basis.  Second, hectares measured through remote sensing do not take into 
account the maturity of the coca plants.  Mature plants can yield up to three 
harvest a year, whereas a new crop may only yield one crop per year.  Third, 
measuring an increase or decrease of coca cultivation in Colombia doesn’t 
account for the regional displacement to a bordering country.  Therefore, to try 
and compare hectares of cultivation pre-Plan Colombia with 2005 would be 
                                                 
108 Government of Colombia, The Balance of Plan Colombia (1999-2005) (Bogotá, 2006), 7. 
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difficult and in the end would probably prove meaningless.  The better indicators 
of Colombia’s success in the CD strategy would be progress made in the six 
other objectives that fall under this pillar of Plan Colombia.     
The COLMIL has improved service integration through the establishment 
of two standing Joint Task Forces: JTF-Omega in the south and JTF-One 
(formerly JTF-Caribe) on the northern coast.  Both have been successful 
endeavors despite the friction caused by divisional commanders who command 
divisions that own the territory that the JTF’s operate within in accordance with 
the Colombian constitution.  The COLMIL has made strides in professionalizing 
their forces.  For example, a Joint Senior NCO Academy is furthering the 
education of the services senior enlisted personnel.  The COLMIL is also 
modernizing their equipment, with large financial support from the United States, 
to include everything from aircraft, riverine boats, weapons, night vision goggles, 
and a wide array of other mission essential combat equipment. 
Integration of a regional/international counter-drug effort has been limited.  
Colombia continues to participate in the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program with 
Peru and the United States.  This program detects, tracks, interdicts, and forces 
down (or shoots down) drug trafficking aircraft.  The ABD program has resulted in 
the interdiction of between three and four metric tons of cocaine annually for the 
past couple of years.  However, coordination for cross border interdiction has 
been virtually non-existent.  The porous borders with Colombia’s five neighbors 
have made ground and “brown”109 water interdiction very difficult.  Blue water 
maritime interdiction in coordination with other countries has been the most 
successful internationally coordinated interdiction effort. 
Progress has been made in neutralizing the financial systems of the 
FARC, ELN, and AUC, though a great deal of work remains to be done.  DAS 
has been able to freeze financial assets as well as capture some the FARC’s key 
financial operatives.  Colombia continues to work with the international 
                                                 
109 “Brown water” is a naval term referring to the inland waterways and the littoral coast lines.  
This term is used in conjunction with “blue water,” which refers to the open seas. 
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community to freeze assets abroad, but this has proven to be a greater 
challenge. 
One of Plan Colombia’s biggest success has been the improvement in 
respect for human rights.  This is based both on a reduction in the number of 
human rights violations, as well as the manner in which the Colombian 
Government and its agencies deal with investigating and prosecuting alleged 
violations.  For example, the Colombian Army, which historically has had the 
most problems due to the nature of its operations and constant contact with both 
civilians and guerrillas, has made substantial improvements with regards to 
human rights.  The COLAR conducts their own vetting process before units are 
submitted for vetting by the U.S. Department’s of State through the Department 
of Defense.  
With respect to the timeline delineated for the securing specific Colombian 
departments, the Government of Colombia is behind by approximately two years.  
Plan Patriota has been very effective in improving the security situation and re-
establishing governmental control.  Although the military role in a counter-
insurgency is of paramount importance, it is only one part of an integrated 
strategy.  As the former SOUTHCOM Commander puts it, “the problems affecting 
Colombia, like most countries in the AOR, cannot be solved solely by military 
means.”110 
4.   Democratization and Social Development 
 Plan Colombia must balance the demands of both security and alternative 
development programs.  The question now is: when will the country shift its focus 
from security to improving the socio-economic programs in the newly reoccupied 
areas of Colombia?  But the sustainability of Plan Colombia is much more than 
just matching resources to objectives.  According to the Colombian 
Government’s study, The Sustainability of Plan Colombia, sustainability “is 
understood to be the ability to integrate social, political, economic, and 
                                                 
110 GEN Bantz Craddock, Testimony to U.S. Congress (Washington, March 2006), 7. 
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organizational factors to bring about results against drug trafficking, and 
guarantee their permanence.”111     
5. Justice Sector Reform 
Justice reform has succeeded in improving three of the five objectives.  
First, the government has improved not only the speed with which investigations 
are carried out, but the thoroughness of the actual investigations.  This was 
evident with the recent investigation of the former DAS Director, Jorge Noguera, 
based on allegations over his collaboration with the AUC back in 2004.112  The 
ability of the government to securely incarcerate still leaves room for 
improvement.  In 2005, a former FARC member incarcerated in a downtown 
Bogotá prison facility disappeared overnight and apparently was permitted to 
walk out.113    
Justice reform has made mediocre progress in eliminating corruption, a 
problem that is endemic to Latin American in general, but exacerbated in 
Colombia by drug money.  While Colombia retains only partial responsibility, they 
must continue to work with the United States to take steps to eliminate the 
production and transiting of narcotics.  Likewise, Europe and Latin America, must 
work harder to reduce their significantly increasing demand.   
 
E.   THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY STRATEGY  
 The Democratic Security Strategy drafted and implemented by President 
Uribe in his first term is the country’s counterinsurgency plan that serves as the 
umbrella document for the COLMIL supporting campaign plans (PLAN 
PATRIOTA, PLAN VICTORIA, and other subsequent campaign plans).  The 
United States Government focus on Plan Colombia because it was a document 
designed specifically for the United States and the international community in 
                                                 
111 Government of Colombia, The Sustainability of Plan Colombia. Strategy for the Fight 
Against Drug Trafficking and Terrorism (Bogotá, 2005), 7. 
112 Collen Cook, Colombia: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress, 
2006), 5. 
113 Based on personal recollection while serving in Bogotá, Colombia from 15 October 2004 – 
1 June 2005. 
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order to articulate a long-term Colombian strategy to deal with the wide range of 
illegal activities and to lay down a domestic and international fiscal plan to 
support it.  A senior U.S. Embassy official claimed, “the DSS is brilliant in its 
simplicity and its recognition of the political history and demographics of 
Colombia that have resulted in the current IAG problem. 
  
F.   THE FUTURE OF PLAN COLOMBIA    
Plan Colombia officially ended at the close of 2005.  However, U.S. 
funding for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, which has no statutory end date, 
has continued.  In January of 2006, the U.S. Congress tasked the State 
Department to look at a multi-year support strategy for Colombia while the topic 
of further support continues to be debated on the floor.  Congress has called into 
question Colombia’s ability to take over the programs currently being provided by 
the United States.114  Commonly referred to as “Plan Colombia II” by some 
Americans in the U.S. Embassy, the Office of the Vice Minister of Defense has 
dubbed the work in progress, “the Consolidation of Plan Colombia.”115   
Working from the premise that U.S. support might decrease in the future, 
the former Colombian Vice Minister of Defense (VMOD), Jorge Mario Eastman 
Robledo, began working on a strategy to sustain the support provided by the 
United States through Plan Colombia.  The VMOD’s office has studied the 
feasibility of “nationalization” (Colombianization) of capacities currently provided 
by the United States (specifically rotary wing support) as a main component of 
the Consolidation Plan.  The VMOD’s focus is on the government’s ability to 
assume costs currently being covered by the United States.  According to one of 
Minister Eastman’s advisors, Luis Lorduy, “it took us [Colombia] over a year to 
actually determine all of the expenses, both the obvious and the not so obvious 
                                                 
114 A basic premise of U.S. support to a partner nation is that there should always be a clear 
endstate with a strategy to curtail support as the partner nation becomes more self-sufficient.  
The United States should not go into a country to help, without a clearly preplanned exit strategy. 
115 Luis Lorduy  Advisor to the Vice Minister of Defense. Interview by author in Spanish, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (28 September 2006). 
 80
costs associated with running the rotary wing program.  It was much more than 
we had thought.  And much more than what you guys thought.”116 
1.  Nationalization   
For the past year, both the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. 
Department of State have been at a deadlock as to what nationalization should 
entail.  The U.S. Government’s idea as articulated by the Department of State’s 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), is to turn the aircraft over to the Colombians; 
they assume financial responsibility for training, maintenance, and operations 
and they continue to use the aircraft in support of eradication.117  The Colombian 
concept is that they are given the aircraft.  They will attempt to fund most all of 
the associated costs, however, they will utilize the aircraft as they see fit.118  This 
undoubtedly means the Colombian Military (COLMIL) will use the rotary wing 
assets to pursue High-Value Targets (HVT’s).119   
This deadlock between the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. 
State Department is based on erroneous assumption by both countries.  First, it 
is presumptuous for the United States to think they can give something to 
somebody, make them pay for it, and yet retain the right to tell them what to do 
with it.120  Second, the Colombians are too tied to their HVT strategy.  Some 
COLMIL officials think that if several FARC HVT’s are captured, the FARC will 
fall in much the same way Sendero Luminoso fell in Peru when the Peruvian 
military finally caught Abimael Guzman.  General Ospina clearly realizes that not 
to be the case, “I realize that capturing one or more HVT will not end the FARC 
and bring them down like when the Peruvians got Guzman.  But we need to 
                                                 
116 Luis Lorduy  Advisor to the Vice Minister of Defense. Interview by author in Spanish, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (28 September 2006). 
117 Paul Mahlstedt, NAS Contractor. Interview by author, Bogotá, Colombia, (29 September 
2006). 
118 Luis Lorduy  Advisor to the Vice Minister of Defense. Interview by author in Spanish, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (28 September 2006). 
119 Both Mahlstedt (speaking for NAS) and Lordouy (speaking for the VMOD) concurred as to 
what nationalization meant to both Colombia and the United States. 
120 This would be analogous to someone giving a used car to a friend in need.  The friend is 
barely able to afford to maintain the car and put gas in it, yet the donor demands that he only 
drive the car where and when the donor sees fit.   
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capture an HVT for confidence, to build confidence with the Colombian 
people.”121  Be that as it may, the amount of resources dedicated to the pursuit of 
HVTs must be balanced with eradication. 
2.  Reality 
A U.S. Embassy official explains that Nationalization, “is really a 
Department of State plan to shift the costs of eradication to the GoC.”  According 
to a retired Colombian National Police Officer, who now works as a NAS 
contractor for the U.S. Embassy, “nationalization sounds good for the services.  
Commanders want to have autonomy to use assets [helicopters] as they see fit.  
However, it probably will never happen.  The Colombians have not come to grips 
with the actual amount that it costs to run the entire program.”122  In 2006, they 
began to incur some of the costs for aviation fuel for the Plan Colombia aircraft.  
“It is one thing to pay for fuel for the helicopters, it is another to incur the costs for 
[all other] expenses.”123  The Government Accountability Office has expressed 
doubts as to the Colombian ability and desire to dedicate the necessary 
resources (funding) to self-sustain the U.S. programs.  However, the former 
SOUTHCOM Commander, General Bantz J. Craddock, in his testimony to 
Congress in March of 2006, expressed, “Colombia’s 2006 national budget 
increased by 13 percent from last year. . .this increased defense spending 
emphasizes Colombia’s commitment to fighting and winning its war.”124  
Furthermore, since the overwhelming re-election of President Uribe on the 28th of 
May 2006 with 62% of the vote125, officials in the Ministry of Defense have 
indicated that Uribe will most likely impose another war tax on the Colombian 
people.  This type of fiscal management by crisis will not serve the Colombian 
                                                 
121 General Carlos Ospina Ovalle, Former Colombian Armed Forces Commander. Interview 
by author in Spanish, (Bogotá, Colombia, 29 September 2006). 
122 Luis Salamanca, NAS Contractor. Interview by author in Spanish, (Bogota, Colombia, 22 
September 2006). 
123 Ibid. 
124 GEN Bantz Craddock, Testimony to U.S. Congress (Washington, March 2006), 7. 
125 Uribe obtained 62% of the vote in an election with two other candidates; leftist Senator 
Carlos Gaviria (22%) and Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa (12%).  Had there been only two 
candidates, Uribe would have easily obtained well over 70%. 
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Government well in the long run.  However, it is very type of astute political 
strategy that Uribe has been utilizing that has made his administration a success.  
The real measure of his long term success will be whether he can replace the 
unpredictable taxation plan with an institutionalized taxation system that will 
provide the necessary resources for the long term. 
3.  Most Dangerous Course of Action 
The most dangerous course of action for both the United States and 
Colombia would be for the United States to withdraw total support, or at least 
greatly reduce the large-level of support that has recently been provided.  This in 
essence is the Drucker theory coming to fruition.   
4. Most Likely Course of Action  
Initial reports from some recent NAS studies have indicated that the 
security for the spray aircraft conducting aerial eradication operations was not 
marketably increased by the security forces on the ground prior to the operation.  
This calls into question the necessity for rotary-wing aircraft (paid for by Plan 
Colombia) to deploy COLMIL troops within a couple of kilometers of the coca 
fields prior to spraying.  It is likely that aircraft dedicated to troops movement may 
be greatly reduced, if not eliminated altogether.  This would not include an 
elimination of Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft or aircraft used for logistical re-
supply.  If this were to happen, it might ameliorate the dispute between the State 
Department and the Colombian Defense Ministry over the use of the aircraft: 
more planes might be available for HVT missions without undermining drug 
control objectives.    
U.S. support to Colombia is committed for 2007.  Support for 2008 seems 
to be a sure thing and may actually increase by $12 million.  After 2009, no one 
is sure what U.S. support for Colombia will entail.  Currently, the Colombian 
Military is not requesting additional resources from the United States: “we don’t 
want more toys, we just want to be able to maintain what we currently have,”  
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argues Luis Lorduy.126  LTC Carlos Berrios, a former MILGP Executive Officer 
now serving on the Joint Staff J5 Americas Division, best summaries the 
Colombian situation, 
 The Government of Colombia must assume much more of 
the burden for security and consolidation of their country.  As they 
are more successful, they must assume a greater financial burden. 
Therefore, our supporting funds can and must be gradually reduced 
(as they are beginning to).  Now that I sit on the Joint Staff, I see an 
AOR that needs to attend to the needs of other countries with serious 
Transnational threats.127 
      
   
 
                                                 
126 Luis Lorduy  Advisor to the Vice Minister of Defense. Interview by author in Spanish, 
Bogotá, Colombia, (28 September 2006). 

































APPENDIX  C.  PLAN COLOMBIA TIMELINE 
 
PLAN COLOMBIA TIMELINE 
 
JULY 1989  U.S. announces CD support for Colombia 
JUNE 8, 1998  Speech announcing the concept to Plan Colombia 
SEP 17, 1999   Generally accepted start date (original Pastrana press release) 
SEP 20, 1999   President Pastrana briefs UN and seeks international support 
SEP 21, 1999   President Pastrana discusses joint support with President Clinton 
AUG–SEP 2000 USSOUTHCOM team in Bogotá helps further develop the plan 
JAN 11, 2000   Clinton announces “urgently needed 2-year funding package”  
JAN 14-15, 2000 U.S. Secretary of State visits Bogotá to explain the U.S. package 
FEB 20 2000  DoS INL, GEN Wilhelm, and Barry McCaffrey brief Congress 
APR 9-11, 2000 President Pastrana visits D.C to lobby support 
JUN 30, 2000   Congress approved (conference free) emergency supplemental 
JUL 13, 2000   PL 106-246 signed into law (strong bi-partisan support) 





















APPENDIX  D.  PLAN COLOMBIA GOAL COMPARISON 
 
          United States     Colombia 
 
1.  Prevent the flow of illegal drugs to US  1.  Promote Peace 
    a.  Conduct Aerial Eradication 
    b.  Conduct Interdiction Operations 
    c.  Modernize & Professionalize Military 
    d.  Recapture Territory 
    e.  Capture High Value Targets (HVTs) 
 
 
2.  Promote Peace     2.  Promote Economic Development 
 
 
3.  Promote Economic Development   3.  Increase Security (Plan Patriota)  
             a.  Recapture Territory 
                 b.  Modernize & Professionalize 
Military 
      c.  Capture HVTs  
             d.  Conduct Interdiction Ops 


















LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Arkin, W.  (2005).  Code Names.  Hanover: Steeforth. 
 
Bailey, C. (2004).  OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador.  Special 
 Warfare, 15, 18-21. 
 
Boville, B.  (2004).  The Cocaine War In Context: Drugs and Politics.  New York: 
 Algora. 
 
Bush, G. (2005).  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
Retrieved 15 December 2005 from http://www.whitehouse.gov 
 
Bush, G. (2001).  Speech by President G.W. Bush.  Retrieved from National  
 Archives website 26 November 2006 from 
 http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v37no45  
 
Cook, C. (2006).  Colombia: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research 
Service, RL32250,1-27. 
 
Craddock, B. (2006).  Posture Statement of United States Southern Command 
 Before the 109th Congress.  Washington: House Armed Services  
 Committee. 
 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.  (2005).  The 
Management of Security Assistance (“The Greenbook”).  Ohio: 
Government Printing Office. 
 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  (2006).  Strength Through Cooperation.  
Retrieved 13 July 2006 from www.dsca.mil  
 
Department of the Army.  (1990).  Colombia: A Country Study.  Washington: 
Government Printing Office.   
 
Downey, G., Galbraith, J. and Kates, A.  (2002)  Designing Dynamic 
Organizations.  New York: Amacom. 
 
Forero, J.  (2006).  Colombia Survives U.S. Plan to Uproot it.  New York Times,  
Retrieved 5 December 2006 from 
www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/19/america/web.0819coca.php 
 





Government of Colombia.  (2006).  Balance of Plan Colombia (1999-2005). 
Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeacion. 
 
Government of Colombia.  (2005).  Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral - 
Economic Commission.  Bogotá: Presidencia.  
 
Government of Colombia.  (2003).  Democratic Security and Defense Policy. 
Bogotá: Ministry of Defense. 
 
Government of Colombia,  (1999).  Plan Colombia. Bogotá: Presidencia. 
Retrieved 26 November 2006 from  
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/colombia/adddoc/plan_colombia 
 
Government of Colombia.  (2005).  Plan Colombia Phase II: Consolidating the 
Fight AgainstDrug Trafficking and Terrorism, Institutional Strengthening 
and Economic and Social Revitalization (working document).  Bogotá: 
Ministry of Defense. 
 
Government of Colombia.  (2005).  Processo de Nacionalizacion de los 
Recursos Provenientes de la Cooperación Bilateral Colombia/Estados 
Unidos.  Bogotá: Ministry of Defense.    
 
Government of Colombia.  (2005).  The Sustainability of Plan Colombia:  
Strategy for the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Terrorism. (draft) 
Bogotá: Ministry of Defense. 
 
Joint Forces Command.  (2004).  Joint Pub 3-07.1: JTTP for Foreign Internal 
Defense. Norfolk: Government Printing Office. 
 
Joint Forces Staff College.  (2000).  Joint Staff Officer’s Guide.  Norfolk: 
Government Printing Office.   
 
Marisa, K.  (2003).  Consolidated Military Attaché and Security Assistance 
Activities: A Case for Unity of Command.  FAO Journal,VII, 6-10.  
 
Maullin, R. (1993).  Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia.  Santa 
Monica: RAND. 
 
Mendel, W. and Turbiville, G.  (1997).  The CINC’s Strategies: The Combatant 
Command Process. Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College. 
 





Passage, D.  (2000).  The United States and Colombia: Untying the Gordian 
 Knot.  The Letort Papers, 1-30.  
 
Porch, D.  (2005).  Preserving Autonomy in Conflict – Civil-Military Relations in 
Colombia.  Unpublished.  Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Porch, D.  and Muller, C.  (2006).  Imperial Grunts Revisited.  Unpublished. 
Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Posada, M.  (2006).  Terrorism in Colombia.  Washington.  Retrieved 23 
February 2006 from www.fpri.org/enotes/latin.20020121.posada 
  
Rempe, D.  (2002).  Counter-insurgency in Colombia: A U.S. National Security 
 Perspective 1958-1966.  Miami: University of Miami. 
 
Russell, R.  (1978).  Civil-Military Relations in Colombia 1946-1965.   
Leavenworth: Leavenworth Press. 
 
Sanchez, F.  (2005).  Conflict, State and Decentralization; from Social Progress 
to Armed Dispute for Local Control, 1974-2002.  London: Crisis States 
Programme. 
 
Stolberg, A.  (2006).  Security Cooperation as a Tool of American Foreign 
Policy.  Address to Foreign Area Officers at the Defense Language 
Institute, Monterey, CA,. 
 
Sullivan, J. and Bunker, R.  Multilateral Counterinsurgency Networks in R.J. 
Bunker (Ed.), Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency. New York: 
Routledge.    
 
Teicher, D.  (2005).  The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism. 
 Counter-Proliferation Paper – Future Warfare Series, no. 28, 1-24. 
 
Unknown.  (2006).  Latin America and the United States: Snubs and 
 Opportunities. The Economist, 381, 37. 
 
U.S. Army Center for Military History.  (2006).  Vietnam. Retrieved 2 November 
2006 from www.army.mil.cmh  
 
U.S. Army South.  (2004).  USARSO 5-Year Colombia Support Plan. 
Unpublished briefing.  San Antonio, TX. 
 
U.S. Department of Defense.  (2005).  Security Cooperation Guidance. 
 Washington: Government Printing Office. 
 
 92
U.S. Government.  (2002).  National Security Strategy.  Washington: The White 
House.   
 
U.S. MILGRP-Colombia.   (2006).  Command Brief.  Unpublished briefing. 
Bogotá: U.S. Embassy. 
 
U.S. MILGRP-Colombia.  (2006).  MILGRP-COL Reorg” memo.  Unpublished 
memo.   Bogotá: U.S. Embassy.  
 
U.S. MILGRP-Colombia.  (2006).  Reorganization Paper.  Unpublished memo. 
Bogotá: U.S. Embassy. 
 
U.S. Southern Command.  (2002).  Synopsis of Plan Colombia.  Unpublished. 
Miami: USSOUTHCOM J5-PLCD. 
 
U.S. Southern Command.  (2005).   Theater Security Cooperation Plan. 
Miami: USSOUTHCOM. 
 
Valentzas, LTC E.  (2006).  Planning Assistance Training Teams – Colombia. 
Brief to SO4760-The Military Advisor Class, Naval Postgraduate School,  
Monterey, CA. 
 
Valentzas, LTC E.  (2006).  United States Military Group Colombia – Security 
Cooperation Update.  Brief to SO 4850 – Seminar in Latin American 
Counter-Insurgency, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
 
Veillette, C.  (2006).  Plan Colombia: A Progress Report.  Congressional 
 Research Service, RL32774, 1-15   
 
Villamizar, A.  (2004).  La Reforma de la Inteligencia. Un Imperativo  
Democratico.  Bogota: Seguridad & Democracia.  
 
Word, W.  (2006).  Nationalization: Embassy Bogota Strategy.  Official DoS 






Berrios, LTC Carlos.  Executive Officer, USMILGP-Colombia. (5 May 2006). 
Interview with Dr. Porch. Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
Berrios, LTC Carlos.  Executive Officer (former), Joint Staff J5. (22 December 
2006). Personal Interview by email. Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
 
Brown, GEN Doug.  Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.  
(7 November 2006). Personal Interview. Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
 
Brown, Michael E.  Army Mission Chief. USMILGP-Colombia. (4 May 2006,  
30 April 2006, 23 September 2006, 22 December 2006). Personal 
Interview.  Bogotá, Colombia.  
 
Castañeda Peralta, Sonia.  Office Administrator. USMILGP-Colombia.  
(27 September 2006).  Personal Interview conducted in Spanish.  Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
 
Doty, LTC Patrick.  Executive Officer. USMILGP-Colombia.  
(24 September 2006).  Personal Interview.  Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
Drucker, Milton.  Deputy Chief of Mission. USEMB-Bogotá.  
(27 September 2006). Personal Interview.  Bogotá, Colombia.  
 
Llonza, TSgT Charolet A.  Personnel Specialist. USMILGP-Colombia.  
(27 September 2006). Personal Interview.  Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
Long, LTC Darryl.  Joint Staff.  J2.  (4 December 2006). Personal Interviews. 
 Monterey, CA. 
 
Lorduy, Luis.  Advisor to the Vice Minister of Defense.  Centro Administrativo 
Nacional. (18 September 2006). Personal Interview conducted in Spanish. 
Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
Mahlstedt, Paul.  Personnel Service Contractor. Narcotic Affairs Section, U.S. 
Department of State.  (29 September 2006). Personal Interview. Bogotá, 
Colombia. 
 
Ospina Ovalle, GEN Carlos.  Commander (former). Colombian Armed Forces.  




Saderup, COL Kevin.  Commander, USMLGP–Colombia. (28 September 2006). 
Personal Interview. Bogotá, Colombia.  
 
Salamanca, Luis.  Aviation Operations Officer. Narcotic Affairs Section, U.S. 
 Department of State. (22 September 2006). Personal Interview conducted 
in Spanish.  Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
 Valentzas, LTC Erik.  Chief, Planning Assistance & Training Team. USMILGP- 
Colombia. (29 April 2006, 4 May 2006, 23 September 2006). Personal 
Interviews. Bogotá, Colombia & Monterey, CA. 
 
Zitto, CPT Bruno.  (30 October 2006). Personal Interview. Monterey, CA. 
 95
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. COL Jorge Silveira 
U.S. Southern Command 
Miami, Florida 
 
4. COL Jorge Matos 
U.S. Southern Command 
Miami, Florida 
 
5. COL Kevin Saderup 
U.S. Military Group – Colombia 
Bogotá, Colombia 
 
6. LTC Mike Brown 
U.S. Military Group – Colombia 
Bogotá, Colombia 
 
7. LTC Erik Valentzas 
U.S. Military Group – Colombia 
Bogotá, Colombia 
 
8. LTC Patrick Doty 
U.S. Military Group – Colombia 
Bogotá, Colombia 
 
9. Mr. Paul Mahlstedt 
U.S. Department of State – Narcotics Affairs Section 
Bogotá, Colombia 
 
10. Professor Jeanne Giraldo 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
